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Abstract 
This dissertation examines strategic learning as learning from events and experiences 
that have significant consequences for organisational survival in a competitive 
environment. The study is centred on design contest as repeat event systems that in 
their time bracketed generational progression, provide for an ideal setting to analyse 
such learning. 
Convergence that constrains experimentation to a few elements that define the 
strategic configuration of organisations is posited as a natural consequence of 
performance feedback. Strategic learning is seen to be manifested in the interplay of 
behavioural and cognitive attributes that moderate such convergence. Effective 
strategic learning is seen as key to distinguishing `winners' from the `also-rans' where 
the former counter overt convergence by striking a balance between ` searching for the 
competitive edge' and `creating the competitive edge'. 
In its conceptualisation of strategic learning, study design, and selection of research 
sites, the study successfully navigates most of the problems that have confounded 
research in the relatively nascent area of strategic learning. The dissertation comprises 
three empirical studies. The first two are based in the quasi-experimental settings of a 
robotic design contest called Robot Wars where the strategic learning model emerges 
by an examination of convergence as consequence of performance feedback, and the 
factors that moderate it. The last study is based on the sequential event system of 
movie-sequels to provide external validity to the study. 
The study presents the first comprehensive examination of strategic learning in repeat 
event systems. It provides empirical evidence for the effect of performance feedback 
on convergence, and the consequences this has for future performance. Evidence for 
the interplay of behavioural and cognitive forces in moderating convergence for 
effective strategic learning, completes the strategic learning model that this 




1.1 Context and Objectives 
"In times of profound change, the learners inherit the earth, while the learned find 
themselves beautifully equipped to deal with a world that no longer exists. " 
(Eric Hoffer, 1955) 
This aphorism from the "Passionate State of Mind" by Eric Hoffer, an American 
social writer, and a one-time Longshoreman, was written more that fifty years ago. It 
will continue to appeal to both individuals and institutions till we continue to 
encounter events and experiences that have significant consequences for survival in a 
competitive environment. Learning from events that have significant consequences 
for `long run adaptability' (Kuwada, 1998) stems from an evaluation of the 
fundamental choices that shape organisational strategy. In this dissertation, we posit 
this as strategic learning or learning that impacts organisational sensemaking for 
striking a balance between convergence to `what worked best' and exploration of new 
strategic choices. 
Strategic learning can also be seen as an extension of `double loop learning' (Argyris 
and Schon, 1979). By definition, double loop learning impacts the fundamental 
assumptions governing a system, or in the organisational context, on the routines and 
practices underpinning the existing strategic choices. Double loop learning tends to 
concern itself with the extent of impact of performance feedback -distinguishing itself 
from the lower order `single loop learning' that is about error correction and does not 
question fundamental assumptions. Strategic learning extends this predominantly 
cross-sectional view by positing a longitudinal perspective that gives emphasis to the 
linkage between two events across time. The first is where performance feedback 
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originates, and the second is the event for which this performance feedback leads to 
action for inducing changes. 
Given the importance of establishing a link between two events across time for 
strategic learning, examining such learning is much enabled in event systems 
characterised by repeat events that have significant outcomes, or strategic events in a 
generational sequence. Given that such events are classified as `repeat events' because 
they share key characteristics like actors, environmental settings and underlying 
concepts, there is a relatively unambiguous link between performance feedback from 
the past event and the resulting action that foreshadows the next event. 
For example, sequential product development like that for the successive generations 
Microsoft Windows, seeks to improve the product in an iterative fashion over time. 
Each generation of the Windows platform provides performance feedback to inform 
the next. Another example is that of movie sequels that we will also use as a research 
site in this dissertation. Here an original concept is extended over time based on 
performance feedback of prior movies. This dissertation seeks to examine strategic 
learning in context of such repeat event systems based on the following central 
questions: 
How does performance feedback from prior outcomes affect subsequent actions? 
and; 
What factors moderate this link? 
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The examination of strategic learning under these questions is as encapsulated in 
figure 1.1. Performance feedback from one seminal event is interpreted and 
assimilated to impact on the organisational core of routines and practices. In turn, the 
`sensemaking' (Weick, 1995) that underpins this assimilation and interpretation 
moderates the propensity to converge. Strategic learning is manifested in how 
organisations strike a balance between converging to strategic choices that shape their 
existing `strategic configuration' (Lengnick-Hall, 1992; Mintzberg et al., 1998), and 
exploring new ones to reshape and modify the configuration. 
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1.2 Motivation 
While managing strategic learning undoubtedly remains critical, the problems in 
examining strategic learning makes research and practice of strategic learning very 
challenging. Extant literature struggles with some well identified bottlenecks that 
make a comprehensive examination of strategic learning difficult. The first relates to 
difficulty in monitoring the learning process over strategic events, as they tend to be 
rather sporadic. The second is the problem of ambiguity between actions and 
outcomes that comprises such experiences (Huber, 1991). Last, but arguably the most 
discussed problem in strategic learning and related research, is the issue of 
multiplicity of levels, actors and the partial contexts in which they engage in learning 
(Levinthal and March, 1993; Weick, 1995; Miner and Anderson, 1999). 
As far as academic research goes, with its relatively greater freedom of choosing the 
settings to examine, these problems can be partially addressed in environments that by 
design control for the discussed factors of performance ambiguity, multiplicity of 
levels and generational identity. The controlled settings make comparison over time 
less susceptible to the influence of exogenous variables. 
Comparison of case study based research in strategic learning supports the assertion 
that controlled settings make a huge difference to modelling of the phenomenon of 
strategic learning. These include case studies on business organisations where the 
study of strategic learning is influenced by uncertainties like those due to market 
conditions (Grundy, 1994 and Kuwada, 1998) and alternatively, organisations like the 
Army (Thomas et at., 2001), where there is relative lack of some of the factors that 
pose methodological challenges. 
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Recently, staged competitive events of Design Contests have come into prominence 
as portals that test new technologies. In such contests, contestant teams pit their 
nascent designs against each other under controlled conditions. In their time bracketed 
and controlled competitive milieu, the contests typify research environments that are 
conducive for strategic learning research. 
Origins of such contests can be traced far back in time. They have been deployed for a 
variety of purposes, ranging from testing new technologies to entertainment and have 
also been used to study socio-technical evolution (Bijker, 1995; Jenkins and Floyd, 
2001). In the last few years, design contests with explicit attribute of heredity, or 
successive contest series, are making their presence felt as important social and 
commercial portals. For example, contests where robotic machines compete against 
each other for establishing superiority of their designs are becoming a wide spread 
phenomenon. The European Land Robot Trials by the German Army in May 2006, 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand challenge of 2004 and 
2005, are prominent examples of such contests. 
From a research point of view, such re-occurring contests are conducive for 
examining strategic learning as a process over time. This learning is manifested in 
shaping of actions from performance feedback over a generation of repeat events. The 
view of teams as an approximation of organisations, albeit with helpful characteristics 
of reduced multiplicity of levels and partial contexts has informed research in 
organisational learning (e. g. Senge, 1990; Edmondson, 1999). Design contests with a 
setting of competing teams in an arena mimic the competitive milieu of the business 
environment: organisations trying to out do each other by seeking that aft elusive 
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competitive edge. Each contest generation is bracketed by a definite time frame. It is 
also a strategic event for contestant teams given the clear and decisive win or loose 
outcome of competitive engagements, often ambiguous and subjective in the real 
world business environment. 
At the last count, only in the sub-category of `Robotic' design contests, there were 
fifty-six contests around the globe deployed for reasons ranging from research and 
education, entertainment to commercial testing of emergent technologies. Old ones 
keep dying and new ones keep mushrooming, albeit making an ever increasing 
number of such events. The indication is that such contests are here to stay, as 
institutional mechanisms that deploy and develop nascent robotic designs for a variety 
of purposes. Thus: 
The importance of and methodological problems in examining strategic learning 
on the one hand, and the opportunity to examine the phenomenon in controlled 
settings of design contests on the other, come together as the motivation behind 
this dissertation. 
The issue of generalisability of findings from such quasi experimental research sites is 
critical to answer the `so what? ' question for implications that can be carried forward 
to organisations in traditional industries. This is addressed in the dissertation by 
examining strategic learning in sequential projects systems in the Motion-Picture 
industry. Movie sequels are repeat event systems as a sequel is an extension of a core 
concept and tends to share characteristics with its predecessors. This resonates with 
the settings of Robot Wars where teams modify their robotic designs over contest 
iterations. 
7 
Interestingly, Robot Wars, a contest deployed as a spectator sport for entertainment 
purposes, where nascent robotic design are pitted against each other in combat, has its 
origins in the motion-picture industry: It's founder Marc Thorpe had a prior career as 
a mechanical model developer for Indiana Jones and Star Wars films. In part, this 
link also helped us in the search for a suitable site that could be examined for 
providing generalisability to our findings from the quasi-experimental site of Robot 
Wars. 
1.3 Overview 
These research sites are profiled in greater detail in the subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation. The dissertation comprises three empirical studies that examine the 
process of strategic learning and factors that affect it. These follow the next chapter 
that discusses the moorings of strategic learning in extant literature. 
1.3.1 Chapter 2 
This chapter profiles the growth in thought on organisational learning and the 
moorings of the relatively new area of strategic learning research. The chapter takes 
into account the mutiple perspectives that contribute to extant literature on strategic 
learning. Constructs from literature that deal with behavioural and cognitive 
explanations of strategic learning are profiled for the potential they offer in 
operationalising strategic learning. 
1.3.2 Chapter 3 
This chapter examines strategic learning as manifested in narrowing of focus to some 
features of the design that are identified as critical to competitive advantage. This 
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concept of `simplicity' (Miller, 1990,1993) is at the core of the chapter that 
addresses the question: How does learning lead to convergence and what are the 
implications of this convergence for subsequent performance? 
The quasi experimental site of Robot Wars as a design contest is examined to provide 
empirical evidence for convergence and for the variation in such convergence 
between the overall set of participant teams and the teams associated with superior 
performance. The study lays ground for examining the moderating effect due to the 
interplay between the inherently contrasting attributes of inertia and aspirations 
strategic learning in context of past performance and experience in the next chapter, 
which examines strategic learning by individual teams as a function of the team's 
inertia and aspirations. 
1.3.3 Chapter 4 
In continuation from the empirical examination of convergence in context of specific 
design features in chapter 3, this chapter broadens horizons to examine propensity to 
change the strategic design, in other words, the strategic configuration. This 
configuration is manifested in the combination of different design features in a design 
space defined by a basic typology of such features. 
Change in the strategic configuration is seen as an indicator of strategic learning, a 
function of performance and past experience in Robot Wars. Inertia and aspirations 
are operationalised based these to provide an explanation for extent of change in 
designs. The chapter addresses the question : How does a team's inertia and 
aspirations affect the convergence associated with strategic learning? 
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1.3.4 Chapter 5 
Given that the examination of strategic learning in the preceding chapters is based on 
a quasi experimental research site, the issue of external validity is important for 
contributions this dissertation seeks to make to the area of strategic learning. For this 
purpose, the research site of motion picture industry is put under focus in this chapter 
to validate the empirical model that posits the twin forces of inertia and aspirations as 
shaping strategic learning. 
We examine movie sequels as repeat event systems in this chapter. Observations from 
the industry on the nature of movie sequels; empirical evidence for inertia and 
aspirations in shaping succesive sequels, and industry specific insights, combine to 
provide external validity to the examination of strategic learning. 
1.3. S Chapter 6 
In this final chapter of the dissertation, we present concluding thoughts and pull 
together the essence of contributions made by this study. We present implications for 
research and managerial practice to close by a discussion on the limitations of the 
study. 
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation 
The three empirical studies that are reported in chapters 3,4, and 5 are interrelated but 
may also be read separately. The next chapter leads the way by looking at extant 
literature and constructs therein that help operationalise strategic learning. Thereafter, 
chapter 3 looks at convergence as a consequence of performance feedback by 
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competing teams in quasi-experimental settings; chapter 4 examines strategic learning 
as a function of the interplay of inertia and aspirations to moderate convergence as a 
consequence of performance feedback; chapter 5 examines strategic learning in the 
shaping of movie sequels again as a function of the twin forces of inertia and 
aspirations, to provide generalisability to this study and; finally chapter 6 sums up the 
contributions made by this study and its limitations. Figure 1.2 provides a schema of 
the progression of the dissertation. 
Figure 1.2: Outline of the Dissertation 
CH 2. What are the theoretical 
underpinnings of strategic 
learning ? 
-Literature Review 
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Moorings and Perspectives in Literature 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the moorings of strategic learning in the wider body of research 
on `learning in the organisational context'. We outline perspectives that shape 
contemporary understanding of learning in, and learning by organisations. This is 
followed by a discussion on learning and the scope of change that learning may 
induce by striking a balance between pressures to converge and the opportunities to 
explore. Strategic learning is then profiled as a phenomenon that juxtaposes 
evolutionary, cognitive and behavioural explanations. 
Theoretical constructs in the ambit of such explanations like sensemaking, variation 
and selective retention, inertia and aspirations, and causality are discussed to illustrate 
their congruence in modelling strategic learning essentially as a capability to 
moderate convergence as a consequence of performance feedback. In the penultimate 
section a commentary on some key strategic learning research is presented. This is to 
highlight conceptual and methodological issues that make a case for design contests to 
be ideal settings for examining strategic learning. 
2.2 Perspectives on Learning 
The growth in literature in organisational learning has been interjected by the 
learning organisation perspective. While the former concerns itself with the intrinsic 
process of diffusion of learning within an organisation (Cyert and March, 1963); the 
latter focuses on the link between learning and competitive performance of the 
organisation (Senge, 1990; Garratt, 1994). Thus by design, the learning organisation 
perspective is oriented towards change for organisations to become better learning 
systems. On the other hand, organisational learning refers to learning in given 
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organisational settings. Arguably, strategic learning, given its focus on learning from 
performance feedback to moderate convergence, belongs more to the fold of the 
learning organisation perspective. 
Easterby Smith (1997) has outlined the literature on learning in the organisational 
context as interplay between several broad disciplinary perspectives. These are 
summarised as follows to lead on to an elaboration on the leanings of strategic 
learning: invariably tied more closely to the perspective called the `strategic 
perspective' which has idea of competitive dynamics at its core. 
o The Psychology and OD perspective has human development in the organisational 
context as its central concern. This perspective is arguably the broadest and 
comprises five sub-themes: Learning can be hierarchically arranged in stages of 
progressive ability to learn when the same situations are repeated; The 
progression in ability to learn is manifested in modification of the cognitive maps 
of individuals; Experiential learning outlines the stages through which individual 
learning is enacted; The concept of learning styles refers to the distinct 
dispositions or preferences individuals may have about the way they want to learn 
and; Why is it difficult to learn? engaging the dichotomy between espoused 
theory and theory in use (e. g. Revans, 1971; Kolb, 1973; Bateson, 1973; Dixon, 
1994; Talbot and Harrow, 1993; Argyris, 1986,1992) 
o The management science perspective is concerned with gathering and processing 
information about the organisation. (e. g. March and Simon, 1958; Argyris and 
Schon, 1978; Huber, 1991; Nonaka and Takuchi, 1995). 
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o The sociology and organisational theory perspective focuses on broader 
organisational social systems and is the founding grounds for the contingency 
approach to organisational systems. (e. g. Pettigrew, 1973; Hedberg, 1981; Talbot 
and Harrow, 1987). 
o The production management perspective examines relationship between learning 
and organisational productivity. Conceptualisation of the learning and experience 
curves associate productivity as a benchmark for organisational learning. 
Organisational process are undermined in this perspective making it difficult to 
examine the link between learning and productivity (e. g. Buzzell and Gale, 1987; 
Garvin, 1993) 
o The cultural perspective relates to cultural characteristics influencing the ability to 
learn. For instance, analysis of learning styles across different countries may 
suggest a cultural affiliation (e. g. Ouchi, 1978; Shibata et al, 1991) 
o And finally, there is the strategic perspective on learning that concerns itself with 
competitive dynamics and competitive performance, the evolutionary and 
processual view of strategy being central to this perspective (e. g. Hamel and 
Prahlad, 1993; Whittington, 1993; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Miner and 
Haunschild, 1995). 
The strategic perspective has its roots in the knowledge based theory of the firm that 
postulates knowledge as a key resource and the cornerstone of organisational systems 
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(Kogut and Zander, 1992,1996; Nonaka, 1994, Spender, 1996; Grant, 1996). This 
perspective on knowledge from the resource based view of the firm views knowledge 
as evolving through iterative cyclical processes; concerns itself with the role of 
learning as a capability that shapes this process to impact organisational performance 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Wernerfelt, 1994; Barney, 1999). 
Learning is associated with an evaluation of performance that is used to retain 
performing elements and discard non-performing ones. Given the baggage of 
performance over time, some elements tend to be ingrained as central to the 
functioning of businesses, whether product design attributes, or best practices for 
project management, among others. The retention prone orientation is a useful 
characteristic that allows seeking efficiency through fine tuning existing elements of 
the configuration. However, it can often block organisational propensity to 
experiment and explore new ways of doing things. Overt convergence at the expense 
of exploration becomes particularly dangerous when the business environment is 
characterised by complexities like frequent and major technological disruptions. 
2.3 Learning and Change 
The higher the level of inter-dependence of actors and higher the complexity of the 
work environment, the greater is the challenge of learning. For this reason, the 
organisational context, juxtaposed with the institutional environment, to define goals, 
means and transactions, is at the heart of learning theories (Anderson, et al., 1988; 
Day and Chen, 1993; Amburguey and Rau, 1996; Tisdell, 1996). 
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The growing complexity and fickleness of the business environment has made the 
distinction between ` mechanistic and organic' forms of organisations increasingly 
relevant to the idea of learning organisations (Bums and Stalker, 1961). The former is 
at odds with the learning organisation premise as there is growing evidence that 
incompatibility with change leads to an unviable organisational schema (Merton, 
1957; Crozier, 1964; Bauman, 1989). 
Before organisational theories came of age, the organic analogy had already extended 
the evolutionary perspective associated with development and change in a variety of 
contexts like societies, technology and knowledge (Comte, 1838; Spencer, 1876). 
The growth in thought on organisations as organic, less predictable and less bounded 
entities, flourished by drawing on these strands to foster what is known as the 
`contingency approach' (Miles and Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979; Shrivastava, 1983; 
Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998 ). 
This approach is relevant to strategic learning as it propounds different strategic 
configurations, or in other words, combination of characteristics into an actionable 
design that is contingent on the strategic direction followed (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1989). By extension, it also emphasises the need to anticipate change and the need for 
feedback from performance to inform such change. 
The arrival of the global corporation in the 1980s presented new decision making 
challenges for managers as conflict, competition and assessment of impact of change 
became ever more complex (Allison, 1971; Child, 1972). The need has been to 
balance the risks and returns related to change in light of the contextual factors that 
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affect the enterprise: for instance, deciding on the appropriate degree of customisation 
of products for strategic niche management (Karnoe, 1996; Lampel and Mintzberg, 
1996). 
The emergence of project-based organisations is arguably the most recent 
development towards attaining a high degree of flexibility in strategic configurations. 
A project based organisation, is one in which structures, empowerment, and resources 
are aligned as far as possible with the needs of projects (DeFillipe and Arthur, 1998; 
Lampel and Jha, 2004). Projects in turn, are customised systems characterised by a 
specified time frame and a unique deliverables. They can be formulated to target 
different emerging needs, and the experiences of doing projects can feedback to 
inform subsequent projects. 
The process of feedback entails diffusion of knowledge to the wider project portfolio 
of the organisation. This diffusion is but a means to the end of improving 
organisational performance. For example, a firm engaged in oil exploration may 
experiment with and successfully deploy innovative cost reduction mechanisms. 
Whether this learned know-how disappears with the completion of the project or is 
carried forward to other projects in the future depends on several interconnected 
factors. This can be listed as: capturing and interpreting this knowledge; internalizing 
and diffusing it through organisational systems and; thereafter, effectively translating 
the knowledge into actions that induce change to improve performance. In the next 
section we look at performance feedback to elaborate on the idea of strategic learning 
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2.4 Strategic Learning 
As contextualised upfront in this dissertation, Argyris and Schon's (1978) framework 
of learning from performance feedback is a useful starting point to conceptualise 
strategic learning. In this framework, `single loop learning' is posited as a lower order 
learning that does not engage governing variables of the system, and is essentially 
operational in nature. For instance, detecting a seasonal drop in sales of a product and 
adjusting production accordingly without causing any upheaval in the nature of 
production technology used. However, when the reasons behind outcomes become 
equivocal, the governing variables like core product technology or established ways 
of working are questioned. The framework labels this as `double loop learning', 
opportunities for which arise when, for instance, there is loss of competitive position 
induced by new product technology being deployed by a rival, or a merger that 
requires reshaping and convergence to agreed and consistent ways of working. 
Furthermore as pointed earlier, double loop learning is closely associated with the 
understanding of strategic learning. Strategic learning shapes actionable feedback 
through moderating the propensity to converge. This is to ensure that experimentation 
with new ways and elements to inform the existing strategic configuration remains on 
the agenda when it comes to translating performance feedback to future actions. The 
longitudinal perspective of strategic learning that seeks a link between two events 
across time to generate the `actionable feedback' is thus what distinguishes it from the 
predominantly cross-sectional view of performance feedback in the `single loop - 
double loop' conceptualisation of performance feedback. 
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During the course of their existence organisations encounter events and experiences, 
which have significant consequences for, and potential in, improving their long run 
adaptive capability' (Kuwada, 1998). Mergers, a major downturn in performance, 
change in leadership, or impact of new technologies that tend to render existing 
business models obsolete, are some examples of such events. 
Organisational efforts to generate actionable feedback from such events to 
foreshadow future events, is a manifestation of strategic learning. We have 
enumerated before the difficulty in action-ability of such feedback in light of 
methodological challenges that confound strategic learning research. We will revisit 
these later in this chapter to reflect on some key literature ascribed to the folds of this 
relatively nascent concept of strategic learning. In the next section we take forward 
our conceptualisation of strategic learning to discuss theoretical perspectives that 
provide behavioural and cognitive explanations to the phenomenon of strategic 
learning. 
2.5 Strategic learning: Explanatory perspectives 
Learning from events with significant consequences is a subject matter that 
encompasses several perspectives: The first is primarily cognitive and referred to as 
the sensemaking perspective (Weick, 1995). The second is learning through creation, 
modification and replication of routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989; Cohen, 1991; Paoli and Principe, 2001), and has origins in the 
evolutionary perspective of `Variation and Selective Retention' (Campbell, 1960, 
1965). The third perspective relates to the propensity to change in light of strategic 
experiences and is arguably, both behavioural and cognitive in orientation. This 
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perspective postulates that interpretation of strategic experiences and their subsequent 
impact is shaped by two forces. One is inertia, understood as the propensity to 
entrench or hold on to a strategic configuration over time (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977; Greve, 1988; Levinthal, 1997). The other is aspirations, understood as the 
propensity to experiment with and change the strategic configuration (Starbuck, 1963; 
Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and March 1981; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). 
The fourth perspective is close to the issue of addressing performance ambiguity in 
strategic learning research. It looks at causality in terms of complexity of causality, or 
extent of heterogeneity of causes attributed to performance (Hedberg et al., 1976). 
All these perspectives recognise the influence of tendency to converge from 
performance feedback over time. In addition to the difficulty stemming from 
complexity in sensemaking when organisations engage in exploration of choices 
outside those that combine to shape the existing strategic configuration, the bias in 
`making sense' of `what works', as in discovering the performing elements of a 
configuration is arguably the first step in evaluating the efficacy of a strategic 
configuration. In context of the `variation and selective retention' paradigm, failure to 
moderate convergence pressures may eventually lead to overt `simplicity'. As a 
consequence of this, variation tends to follows retention where experimentation is 
limited to improving those elements of the existing strategic configuration that are 
locked in the organisational mindset as being central to performance. 
The perspective that examines `propensity to change' as a tension between inertia and 
aspirations, is directly related to the issue of moderating convergence as a 
consequence of performance feedback. Finally, the last perspective of `causality' that 
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we enumerate, also relates to how past performance is reflected upon, whether it is 
confined to a few explanations or alternatively, examined in context of a wide range 
of factors. 
In the sections to follow, we outline each of these perspectives with a view to 
examining their potential contribution to the understanding of strategic learning. 
Z. 5.1 Sensemaking 
For the purpose of strategic learning research, the process that leads to an 
interpretation of the action-outcome relationship is referred to as "sensemaking" 
(Weick, 1995). Sensemaking is a rather vaguely defined term borrowed from 
psychology (e. g. Kaplan and Kaplan, 1977). It can be seen as a "socio-cognitive 
process" (Resnick et al 1991) that has been used to connect human cognition to the 
environment, to also throw light on how people or actors partially produce the 
environment they face (Berger and Luckman, 1967; Kaplan and Kaplan, 1977; Pondy 
and Mitroff, 1979; Daft and Weick, 1984). 
Despite its conceptualisation by Weick (1979) as not only a metaphor or being about 
developing plans, but as a concept that is in some ways codifiable, sensemaking 
remains difficult to decipher given its origins in human cognition. The concept has 
found appeal in empirical strategy research to do with industrial schema (e. g. Porac, 
Thomas and Baden fuller, 1989; Anthony et al, 1993; Martins and Kambil, 1999; 
Johnson and Hoopes, 2003), and easily forms a central feature in any explanation that 
is attributed to the phenomenon of strategic learning. 
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In Weick's construction of the idea, sensemaking is mainly "retrospective", as in 
making sense of past experiences; however, "prospective" sensemaking has had its 
role recognized in literature as in making sense of anticipated future events (Gioia and 
Mehra, 1996). In literature "discovery" and "foreshadowing" as strategic learning 
constructs also mirror the temporal nature of sensemaking (Snyder and Cummings 
1998; Schulz, 2001). 
Sensemaking as a socio-cognitive process to reflect on the past and anticipate the 
future remains central to learning. However, being embedded in human and social 
cognition arguably makes it very susceptible to convergence that we have referred to 
as a natural consequence of performance feedback. There are no prescriptions about 
`right' sensemaking that balances convergence with exploration. Empirical evidence 
suggests that in situations of high environment complexity and uncertainty, 
organisations are disposed towards avoiding cognitive pressures for making choices 
based on exploration outside the existing configuration (Hammer and Champy, 1993; 
Miller and Shamsie, 1999). Sensemaking remains a product of, and also shapes, 
organisational mindsets 
- 
the rationale behind why most organisations find effective 
learning so difficult and at other times, never quite find the optimum balance between 
convergence and exploration. 
There is a more explicit side to strategic learning than the very broadly scoped and 
arguably non-codifiable cognitive process of sensemaking. This is concerned with 
explicit takeaways from experience in the form of say improvements to routines that 
are the genetic codes of the organisation's knowledge base (Nelson and Winter, 1982) 
and has been referred to as "genetic learning" (Lampel and Jha, 2003). 
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2.5.2 Variation and Selective Retention 
The Variation and Selective Retention (VSR) paradigm is central to the evolutionary 
perspective and has groundings in biological evolution. It was originally used outside 
it to provide an explanation for the evolution of knowledge (Campbell, 1960,1965), 
and has well documented parallels in organisational and social evolution (e. g. 
Campbell, 1969; Weick, 1979; NW, 1982; Baum and Singh, 1994). Strategy research 
has also drawn on these developments, like for example, the conceptualization of the 
VSR process at different levels in organisations, and in a succession over time that 
sees emergence of new populations from the old (e. g. Lomi and Larsen, 1996; 
Ginsberg et al, 1999). 
VSR is `blind' in the natural selection order of things. This implies that at the most 
fundamental evel variation processes do not know which of the variants they produce 
will turn out be selected. Darwinian evolution and to an extent, the basics of economic 
life as in the natural selection triggered by demand and supply, are expositions of this 
idea. 
The VSR model is not blind all the time, as unlike natural selection and in some ways 
economic life, not all systems are characterised by lack of goal directedness. 
However, the adjustments towards `directed' (as against `blind') VSR are labelled as 
`inductive achievements' of some original blind-VSR in the past. The ` blind' 
component is said to exist at, at least some levels of the concerned system (Campbell, 
1965). Different evolutionary theorists have adjusted the VSR paradigm for their 
domains. For example, the `goal directedness' in evolution of socio-cultural artefacts 
24 
differentiates it from the `blind' evolution by natural selection (Basalla, 1988). The 
aspect of goal directedness is also seen as critical in defining learning performance in 
organisations (Levinthal and March, 1981; Lant, 1992). 
Bickhard and Campbell (2003) emphasise that the concept of variation and selection 
has a broad scope and requires adjustment to provide an explanation to different 
phenomenon. One of the points they make to structure this argument is that there are 
"intrinsic explanations" unique to the system where there is "an involvement of some 
agent that is capable of goals or purposes". Intrinsic explanations refer to explanations 
that depend on internal characteristics of the system. Bickhard and Campbell also use 
the concept `boundary conditions' in their argument. The concept of `boundary 
conditions' has parallels with rules in an organised contest's perspective that scopes 
and limits the action-outcome interactions. The `agents' or players, make strategic 
choices within the scope of the `boundary conditions' for achieving their goals. 
Choices that shape strategic configurations are subjects to the VSR process. When 
convergence sets in and starts compromising exploration, the focus is increasingly on 
improving and fine tuning the existing elements of the configuration. When it is only 
these retained features that are subjected to experimentation, variation tends to 
follows retention. By extension, one can say that this is evolution gone wrong by 
overt propensity to converge. Effective learning for adaptability in a dynamic 
environment would thus entail moderating such pressures for convergence. 
The idea of the connection between learning capability and evolution is quite old. It 
has been discussed by biologists in the 19th century (Baldwin, 1896; Morgan 1896) 
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and has been extensively taken forward in recent times in the development of artificial 
intelligent systems (e. g. Newell and Simon, 1972; Belew, 1990), research in complex 
adaptive systems (e. g. Holland, 1975; Holland et al, 1986) and in studies on 
emergence of organisational populations (e. g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977,1989; 
Lomi and Larsen, 1996; Ginsberg et al, 1999). Contemporary research in the area of 
artificial intelligence is also an indication of the potential of this connection (e. g. Jain 
et al, 1996; Xiong, 2001). 
2.5.3 Inertia and Aspirations 
Learning capability and evolution are connected by the enactment of learning that 
induces change in strategic configurations. This enactment is controlled by the 
`propensity to change' that is both self referential and comparative i. e. with reference 
to the performance of rivals. For instance, a firm may make online sales a priority 
because of a good feel about the potential of e-commerce, or in turn, it may be 
influenced by the performance of rivals in the industry who have significantly 
increased their revenues through online sales. 
Organisational inertia and managerial aspirations are defining variables for 
`propensity to change' in light of given performance. In event of strategic experiences 
such change impacts on the fundamental assumptions that shape the organisational 
core of routines and practices, or in other words the strategic configuration of 
organisations that encounter such experiences. 
The specific use of organisational inertia as a disposition that influences the capacity 
to change is strongly linked to the theory of organisational routines (Cohen and 
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Bacdayan, 1994). Literature posits a variety of sources for organisational inertia. 
Though inertia has been argued to have political and cognitive leanings (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984), in the main, extant literature sees inertia as behavioural in 
orientation: protecting that status-quo and suppressing rationales that call for change 
in strategic configuration. Cyert and March (1963) and Nelson and Winter (1982) see 
inertia as a function of embedded rules, routines, and practices that emerge over time 
and provide consistency in the way organisations deal with the business environment. 
The concept of inertia is very widely used in research given its metamorphosis that is 
inexplicably intertwined with organisational development. It has found place in 
discussions on organisational and industry evolution, in discussing the impact of 
positive feedback in making it difficult to change strategic direction, and in 
investigating organisational learning (Hannan and Freeman, 1977,1984; Kelly and 
Amburgey, 1991; Amburgey et al., 1993; Levinthal, 1997; Wright and Goodwin, 
1999; Burgelman, 2002; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002). 
Organisations respond to performance by reinforcing what worked best in the past, 
rather than exploring alternatives that may lead to even better performance: a 
perspective that has shaped the idea of `simplicity' versus variety in experimentation 
(Miller, 1993). The literature sees an inherent opposition between inertia and 
aspirations. Aspirations being a general term used to describe future orientation by 
individuals and organisations. The `level' of aspirations, unlike inertia is less 
ingrained in over time emergence of rules, routines and practices. It is more fickle; is 
arguably a function of short-term performance and; is seen as relatively more 
cognitive in orientation. 
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The relationship between performance and aspirations is strongly mediated by what is 
learned from performance (Starbuck, 1963; Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and 
March 1981). In the case of inertia the learning focuses on current routines and 
practices, and more generally on the effectiveness of current configuration and its 
constituent elements that have emerged over time. In the case of aspirations, the 
learning focuses on the degree of effort that is needed to attain aspirations, and 
resourcing of these efforts. From a learning perspective, performance is often 
interpreted in context of causality, or the interpretation of the reasons behind the 
realised outcome. Shaping of inertia and aspirations subsequent to performance is also 
likely to be influenced by this interpretation which we discuss in the next section as 
`causality'. 
2.5.4 Causality 
Complexity of causality, or multiplicity of factors that can be ascribed to 
performance, has been examined in recent literature. It has been frequently cohabited 
the space of causal ambiguity, which is a concept that implies lack of clarity in 
causality, somewhat different from multiplicity in causality. Causal ambiguity is seen 
as the main bottleneck in achieving resource imitability and reducing the risk 
associated with change (Reason, 1997; Ambrosini and Bowman, 2005). On the other 
hand, complexity has a more positive perspective on multiplicity of factors as an 
opportunity to learn as against converging to a few easily available explanations 
(Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1987; Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; 
Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). 
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Low complexity or homogeneity implies fewer interconnected factors and by 
extension, high complexity or heterogeneity suggests several and highly 
interconnected factors. Empirical evidence seems to be in favour of heterogeneity 
providing more opportunities to seek improvement in strategic configurations, albeit 
the risks of misinterpretation leading to expensive failures remain (Haunschild and 
Sullivan, 2002). Homogeneity in causal factors is in some ways convergence at the 
stage of performance evaluation itself. This biases learning even before the feedback 
impacts to shape the set of choices defining the strategic configuration. Arguably, in 
this case, convergence becomes both a precursor to learning and a consequence of it. 
Attribution to sources of causality has also been examined in context of downturns in 
organisational performance, and strategic events in organisational life (e. g. Hedberg et 
al., 1976). Locus of causality or attribution is seen in literature to be associated with 
the perception of controllability (Seligman, 1975; Miles, 1982; Greenberger and 
Strauss, 1984; Ford 1985). The perception of control on factors to which performance 
downturns are attributed has different implications for the strategic actions taken, 
especially in response to performance downturns. When such actions stem from a 
perception of control over causal factors it may be founding grounds for aspirations to 
better address such factors. By extension, given the perceived risk quotient, the 
propensity to change may be reduced if there is a perception of lack of control on 
factors that influence performance. 
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2.6 Strategic Learning Research and Design Contests 
As discussed upfront in shaping the motivation for this dissertation, research in 
strategic learning has been constrained by the following difficulties: 
a) Monitoring the learning process over strategic events or strategic experiences, 
as they tend to be relatively rare and infrequent; 
b) Performance ambiguity that characterises input-output relationship in context 
of strategic experiences and; 
c) Multiplicity of levels, actors and the partial contexts in which they engage in 
learning 
(Huber, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; Glynn et al, 1994; Weick, 1995; Miner 
and Anderson, 1999; Lampel and Jha, 2003). 
In Table 2.1 we outline some key literature that is ascribed a direct association with 
strategic learning. However, this is not an exhaustive listing of research that could 
claim to be in the area of strategic learning. The brief commentary presented for these 
papers, summarises conceptual and methodological issues of interest given our 
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Methodological issues that make strategic learning research difficult can be addressed 
to a large extent in environments that by design control for factors of complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity. For instance, behavioural simulations have found appeal in 
investigation of inter-organisational learning in organisational ecology studies (e. g. 
Ginsberg et. al, 1999; Baum and Berta, 1999) and laboratory experimentation has 
informed the areas of organisational memory and routines (e. g. Cyert and March, 
1963; Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). 
As outlined earlier in this dissertation, naturally occurring and highly structured 
environments like design contests have characteristics, which are relevant for 
investigating strategic learning, and are similar to that of organisations. They have 
been investigated for studies in socio-technical evolution and competition using 
archival data that arises in a contest perspective; is structured by rules; has specified 
conditions of entry and exit; has limited influence of external variables and; has clear 
performance assessment mechanisms (e. g. Bijker, 1995; Jenkins and Floyd, 2001). 
In the business world such systems can be found wherever competition is structured 
by technology and industry structure into sequential competition; for instance, a 
generational succession of projects as design events benchmarked against similar 
projects of other organisations. We use design events in the settings of the design 
contest of Robot Wars as the quasi experimental research site for this study. Here 
competition and its outcome are clearly discernable through robotic designs in 
combat. Thereafter, we examine strategic learning in the sequential project system of 
Hollywood movie sequels to provide external validity to the study. 
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2.7 Discussion 
In this chapter we have outlined the moorings of strategic learning within the wider 
body of organisational learning research. The different perspectives outlined as 
explanations of strategic learning, help reflect on strategic learning in context of the 
tendency to converge as a consequence of past performance. 
We have also briefly discussed ` causality' as an explanatory perspective for strategic 
learning. This is given its connection with strategic learning by way of the perception 
of control on causal factors and opportunity to learn from multiplicity in causal 
factors. Though we do not explicitly examine causality in this dissertation, it remains 
of interest for future research, especially in connection with the interpretation that 
underpins different performance assessment mechanisms we come across in the 
subsequent chapters. 
In the next chapter we examine `simplicity' (Miller, 1993) in experimentation versus 
`variety' in experimentation as a precursor to the examination of inertia and 
aspirations in shaping strategic learning in the chapters thereafter. The duality of 
variety and simplicity closely approximates the classic tension between ` exploration 
and exploitation' (March, 1991). Simplicity resonates with `exploitation' while 
variety shares space with `exploration' by looking at future possibilities that are 
outside the ambit of the existing configuration. 
The simplicity perspective posits that competitive performance tends to embed 
specific features of design in the organisational mindset as being central to 
competitive advantage. In turn, these features tend to absorb most of the 
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organisational resources for experimentation. Engaging in this `search' for sources of 
competitive advantage as against, `creating' new sources of competitive advantage, 
has been seen as the failing of many a established business models and successful 




The Failings of Simplicity: 




Learning from performance feedback in repeat event systems leads to a `convergence' 
to some parts of the strategic configuration that are seen as central to performance 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1986). Such convergence represents a movement towards 
`simplicity' as it reduces the variety in experimentation that is associated with a given 
strategic configuration over time (Miller, 1993). In the case of repeat event systems, 
such an association of performance feedback with convergence is more pronounced. 
This is because there is a clear generational relationship between events that allows 
performance feedback to be readily linked to different parts of the configuration. In 
the case of repeat events with `significant consequences' by extension, this is link is 
very crucial in informing strategic choices. 
While harnessing and improving the performing elements of a configuration is 
important for performance in the short run, superior performance in the long run 
requires moderating convergence to simplicity. The need is to `seek to create' rather 
than only `search for the competitive edge' in light of past performance (Miller, 1996; 
Miller and Shamsie, 1999). 
One of the numerous accounts that illustrate how avoiding simplicity can lead to new 
breakthroughs for creation of sources of competitive advantage is Canon's success in 
the photocopying market. The need to break into the market as a new incumbent in 
the 1960s led Canon to reshape the core technology in a `variety of areas' as against 
`simply' focus on getting better at the established standards leading from the 
dominant Xerox model. 
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This chapter examines the tension between variety in experimentation and simplicity 
that constraints experimentation. We illustrate the impact of learning on convergence, 
and the implications this has for subsequent performance. We do this in the quasi 
experimental settings of Robot Wars, a design contest that we have introduced before 
and elaborate upon in this chapter. 
Based on analysis of variance in design features, we interpret results that show 
differences in such convergence between performance groups, and the overall set of 
participant teams in the contest. Our results suggest that superior performance is 
characterised by a relatively higher level of experimentation. 
3.2 Convergence and Simplicity 
Simplicity resonates with the notion of inertia, where organisational efforts are 
directed at improving and sustaining what they are already good at. It has similar 
consequences for long run adaptability of organisations by increasing incongruence 
with the environment and eventually resulting in a conflict with environment; the 
story behind numerous corporate disasters (Starbuck, Greve and Hedberg, 1978; 
Meyer and Starbuck, 1991). 
This is partly because success in particular usually brings with it a propensity to 
preserve it, an idea that is at the core of simplicity. As an organisation experiences and 
attributes more and more success to certain features of its business model, it responds 
by inducing more systemisation to exploit the successful model by focussing on these 
`select' features. 
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We have argued that specific design features embedded as a source s of competitive 
advantage constrain variety in experimentation by absorbing all efforts at 
experimentation for improving future performance. The search process informed by 
competitive performance over rides the propensity for exploration to create new 
sources of competitive advantage. 
In making the connection between evolutionary theory, and learning from 
performance, Tushman and Romanelli's (1985) model of convergence closely 
approximates the `variation and selective retention paradigm', which is at the heart of 
the evolutionary theory (Campbell, 1965). The model captures how experience with a 
given design feedbacks to inform underlying assumptions about the design. 
Subsequently, this shapes actions to experiment (variation 
-fermentation) for 
improving the design's performance under conditions of competition, where 
successful characteristics are retained for future designs (selection-heredity). 
The manifestation of simplicity in this context is that organisations frequently choose 
to focus on retained design features for variation: performance based retention locks 
`select' features as being key to competitive advantage (Levitt and March, 1988, 
March, 1991; Miller 1993). Thus, variation tends to follow retention, eventually 
bringing organisations in conflict with the environment. 
The extent to which an organisation subscribes to `simplicity' as against `variety' in 
experimentation reflects on the `sensemaking' (Weick, 1979) process that underpins 
organisational interpretation of strategic experiences. Sensemaking of strategic 
experiences is different at different levels of the organisation. Thus, it is frequently 
difficult to examine the extent and the manner in which performance of a deployed 
design is drawn on to inform the tension between simplicity and variety in 
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experimentation to inform strategic choices. Furthermore, extant literature suggests a 
need for examining simplicity over time to get a better picture of this tension (Miller, 
1993). 
In the following section we profile the design contest of Robot Wars. As indicated 
before staged competitive events with multiple episodes of competition over time, and 
clearly delineated levels viz. organisers and contestants, are ideal settings for 
examining convergence to simplicity over time in response to performance feedback. 
3.3 Robot Wars 
3.3.1 A Background 
Robot Wars is one of the labels given to the sport of Robotic Combat, described as 
"the first sport to break into the popular culture in the new century" (Stone, 2003). 
Robot Wars is a tournament style competition where contestant teams participate 
through their remote controlled robotic designs that compete by combat under 
specified rules in a given arena. It ran on the BBC over 1998 to 2003 and a total of 
seven series were telecasted during this time, re-runs of the show are still popular on 
European television. 
Robotic contests were first staged in the 1970s in MITs mechanical engineering 
classes. The first robotic combat event, Critter Crunch, was presented at the 1986 
science fiction convention in Denver and the first tournament style robotic combat 
event, Robot Sumo, was organized by Fujitsu's chairman Hiroshi Nozawa in Japan in 
1990. Fujitsu's involvement being an indication of corporate interest in design 
contests as portals to experiment with nascent technologies. The robotic contest 
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concept was subsequently transformed into a spectator sport by toy designer Marc 
Thorpe who developed mechanical models for such films as Indiana Jones and Star 
Wars. From 1994 to 1997, Thorpe's tournament, called Robot Wars, brought together 
a dedicated group of enthusiasts in the San Francisco Bay area. He subsequently fell 
out with his main investor, and after a prolonged legal conflict the event shut down in 
1998. The next year it split into Battle Bots in the United States, and Robot Wars in 
Britain (Stone, 2001,2003). 
Robot Wars is an institutional system with the primary goal of spectator entertainment 
much like the gladiator events of the coliseum days, albeit through deployment of 
nascent and attractive robotic designs in combat. The teams are arranged in 
elimination rounds or `heats' where the winners progress to the next level, 
culminating in the series final as illustrated in figure 3.1. When teams participate in 
the next series they have the experiences of the previous series to interpret what is 
likely to work, and what is not, from amongst the multitude of design options 
available within the rules of the contest. Appendix A presents the charts for 
progression in each of the seven series of Robot Wars. 
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Figure 3.1: Illustrative Chart of Progression: A Robot Wars Series 
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The rules do not allow for making changes to the deployed designs during a series 
itself apart from repairs that may be required to address damage sustained in combat 
and necessary for a design's operability in the next stage of the contest series. 
Matches are frequently decided by a knock-out, sometimes due to damage sustained 
in combat and at other times due to defects like engine failure. There is also a set time 
for which the combat takes place, if there is no result at the end of this, judges 
comprising mainly of experienced robotiers, and presenters from other technology 
intensive television shows decide the winner based on criteria of attacks made and 
damage delivered. The robotic combat takes place in an enclosed arena that has 
special features like spikes and flame pits as hazards and as tactical options for the 
contestants. Appendix B provides a floor plan of the battle arena: a microcosm of the 
business arena with the research advantage of. absence of any incertitude about 
performance, actors, and what comprises the deployed designs. 
The robots deployed in combat are designed with different features of weaponry, 
engine types and physical dimensions within the scope of the rules specified for the 
contest. These robots are remote controlled by the respective robotiers or contestant 
teams in glass boxes perched at a level higher than the arena. A remote controlled 
ref-robot or referee is also there to supervise the combat. House robots are present to 
control the combatants and also to act as potential hazards; these are remote operated 
by house robotiers: the robotiers used by the contest organisers to built and operate 
these machines. The house robots tend to provide an element of uncertainty to the 
combat environment. They are unpredictable and attack contestants that get too close 
and scavenge on the ones that are immobilised or in difficult situations. 
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Pre and post match follow up with teams and house robotiers adds to the build up to 
the combat show which is delivered by the medium of television to the audience. 
Presenters provide live commentary of the combat and live audience is also present to 
complete the feel of a coliseum show. In addition to recognition based on winning in 
combat, critical acclaim in the shape of special award nominations are also strived for 
by contestant teams. 
Such nominations are generated by web-based forums e. g. The Tornado Robot Wars 
forum on: http: //Www. teamtornado. co. uk. That many of these forums are patronised 
by contest organisers shows the interest they have in this performance assessment 
mechanism to complement the combat performance of contestant teams. Each forum 
has its own choice of teams for different nominations, and takes into account the 
views of contest organisers, show presenters, and also the views of select audience 
that may choose to participate in such forums. In addition to design features and 
performance in combat, we also took a count of these nominations across such forums 
for each contestant team to inform our data. 
3.3.2 The Robot Wars Community 
Research suggests that diffusion of learning is facilitated by the formation of a 
community that is held together by shared interests and common goals. Robot Wars is 
characterized by such a structure and learning does not occur in isolation for the 
contestant teams, it is informed and influenced by performance and opinions related to 
other teams. 
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Discussions on battles, design features, and also strategies to combat dominant teams, 
feature prominently on web-based discussion forums associated with Robot Wars. 
Though, with the end of Robot Wars as an ongoing show, there has been a sharp 
decline in such forums, the records to date provide useful data. 
When they were active, these forums were home to community like structures that 
went beyond just being a `community of interest', where people interested in Robot 
Wars could share views. The richness of interaction and the participation of contestant 
team members on such forums suggests that they form a `community of practice' 
much along the lines described by Wenger and Snyder (2000). 
These forums also provide evidence that in several instances, participants meet 
outside the virtual world to share technical expertise and knowledge. Archived 
interviews with several of the regular teams at Robot Wars provides a source of 
information for other teams, especially if the interviewed team was a relatively more 
successful team, and/or had similar design features. 
Beyond interviews with teams, more diverse opinion and analyses can be found on the 
web forums. We find comment and discussion by a variety of participants such as: 
contestant team members, technically savvy fans who were not participants in Robot 
Wars, other fans, and sometimes also individuals interested in robotics but not 
necessarily in Robot Wars as an entertainment show. These forums have informed the 
understanding of the contest environment of Robot Wars. However, as they do not 
cover many of the teams in the contest, their use in informing data on robotic designs 
of individual teams has thus not been possible. An excerpt from a discussion thread 
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is presented below to illustrate the knowledge sharing that went on in these forums to 
inform the practice of robotic combat at Robot Wars. 
[In the discussion: Tornado, Dantomkia and Antweight are names of Robotic designs 
associated with different teams. In the superscript are names/pseudonyms/ team 
affiliations of the discussion participants] 
Conan (The Destroyer) Is there any way that Tornado's pushing power could be 
doubled? 
Nathan Hi Andrew, sorry I didn't post yesterday, I was a bit ill but I'm okay now! Just 
how much can the most powerful pusher (Tornado! ) push? (weight)..... would you be 
able to add the disc and fix problems in drive reliability? Also has there been any 
work on Tornado after the 5th wars? Can you also come to Leverstock Green 
... 
Anthony mailed you the details 
... 
Suk-hwa Chung (Sukhwa) Conan, Tornado's pushing power can be doubled perhaps 
by replacing the current Bosch GPA's with motors with double the power perhaps? 
Andrew Marchant (Tornado) It's difficult 
- 
it could only really be done if the weight 
limit was doubled! More power would help, but that needs bigger batteries, and 
Tornado already weighs nearly 100kg. If Mike Lambert puts Dantomkia in Series 6 
then we'll have no chance of winning! So I'd better say that we will do something 
about the design of the side, yes 
- 
for those of you that haven't heard, Mike's robot 
went through the side of Tornado 
Ed (Stormp)) Andrew.... Dantomkia IS entering Series 6- go look at the thread 
entitled Dantomkia in the competitors thread. Perhaps you'd better start work on the 
design of the side ; o) 
[Tornado Robot Wars Forum, 2002] 
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As illustrated, there was an opportunity for different teams to benefit from the 
debates, arguments and observations to make sense of the performance feedback that 
characterized a range of contestant teams. This could be used to inform potential 
design changes for improving one's own machine deployed in combat, and to counter 
schemes of rival teams. Design features influential in combat performance were 
highlighted and reflected upon. Free-lance technical suggestions and inputs about 
what different teams were doing, contributed to the understanding of what mattered as 
a competitive edge, and what could be done to exploit it for augmenting one's own 
performance. 
3.4 Hypotheses 
In Robot Wars, each contest series is a strategic experience for contestant teams that 
engage in `win or loose' combat events. Evidence about what is critical for 
performance and what is not accumulates over successive series in Robot Wars. The 
interpretation of this evidence is likely to orient the participating teams in future 
series to converge towards some design features as critical for performance and 
thereby focus their experimentation effort to improve these. For instance, if many of 
the eliminations are based on robots being flipped over, focus may be drawn to reduce 
ground clearance so that the opposition's flipper weapon cannot get under the 
machine. Similarly, if the arena hazards cause lot of eliminations, efforts may be 
focussed at altering the width or length of the machine for reducing the turning radius 
to avoid such hazards. This assertion of overtime performance leading to behaviour 
of converging to a few elements within the design envelope gives us the following 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Overtime, competitive performance will lead to behaviour that 
promotes experimentation with a reducing number of design features by the overall 
set of contestant teams. 
The successful contestant teams or teams that win their respective heats can be 
expected to contribute to the most popular set of design features for adoption in the 
next series. Though there is only one eventual winner, the idea behind using heat- 
winners (see figure 3.1) instead is that such adoption is also contingent on how close a 
design is to one's own design. For example, a team that has a flipper weapon is more 
likely to adopt features from a successful team that has a similar weapon (but say 
lower ground clearance) than from the eventual series winner with a battery operated 
cutting disc, whose features call for too many changes in the base design. Irrespective 
of the interpretation and subsequent convergence that manifests the overall set of 
contestant teams, the successful contestant teams in Robot Wars, as with successful 
businesses, may also come to repeatedly focus experimentation to hone certain design 
features that are seen as crucial to performance: `premium group but herd behaviour 
all the same! ' This gives us the following hypothesis for the teams successful in 
combat (heat winners) in Robot Wars: 
Hypothesis 2: Overtime, competitive performance will lead to behaviour that 
promotes experimentation with a reducing number of design features by contestant 
teams that are successful in combat. 
Our discussion of the literature supports that countering the effects of performance for 
a convergence to simplicity is key to future performance. The overall set of contestant 
teams, with the `also-rans', and the sub-set of winning teams are likely to differ by 
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virtue of how they strike a balance between variety and simplicity in experimentation. 
If the assertion that sustaining superior performance through simplicity is a fallacy 
were to hold, then given a superior performance bracket, the heat winners are likely to 
be characterized by greater experimentation with new design features. These are new 
in the sense that they are not a repeat of past design features experimented with. This 
gives us the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: In comparison to the overall set of contestant teams, greater 
experimentation will characterise teams that are successful in combat. 
As discussed, the primary objective of Robot Wars is spectator entertainment through 
an attractive display of robotic designs engaged in combat. The attributes of 
unpredictability, drama and competitiveness in such combat, are all key to achieving 
the entertainment objective. At the level of the contestant teams, the competitive 
environment is likely to support convergence as teams engage in a search based on the 
performance of robotic designs in the past, for the best possible configuration of 
design characteristics that is likely to improve combat performance. 
This is at odds with the contest objective of entertainment that is fuelled by 
unpredictability and surprise. Thus, at the level of the contest organisers, there may be 
propensity to moderate convergence in designs deployed by contestants over 
successive series. As discussed, in Robot Wars, recognition is generated not only for 
teams whose robotic designs win in combat but also in the form of critical recognition 
manifested in special award categories like most innovative design, most destructive 
battle participants, among others. Such an alternative performance assessment 
deployed through institutional mechanism may influence variety in experimentation. 
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While the hypotheses enumerated before were based on competitive performance in 
combat, in our final hypothesis we contextualise the influence of the performance 
mechanism of critical recognition: 
H4: Critical recognition through special award nominations will lead to behaviour 
that promotes experimentation by the overall set of contestant teams. 
3.5 Data and Variables 
The data is sourced from archival information present on the Tectonic Robot Wars 
web site: http: //www. tectonic. force9. co. ukl (Mountjoy, 2001-2003) 
The web site has data and information for the first four series (1998-2000) of Robot 
Wars. Other web sites, for instance, the Robots Rule web site: http: // www. btinternet. 
com/ patricks. web/robots/(Houghton, 2002-2004), with information on these series 
and also the subsequent three series have been accessed. 
The first four series are used in analysis as the data for the latter three series is 
characterised by missing information on design for about 38 teams in total. This does 
not allow us to account for the entire set of participant teams or for all the heat 
winners for these three series. Given this, we have used data from the first four series 
in our analysis for this chapter. Changes in rules and in settings of the contest arena 
over successive series are also available from the aforesaid archival sources and have 
been found to be relatively consistent over successive series. They have been 
discussed on several sites and have been crosschecked for the reliability (Amok, 
2001-2004, Houghton, 2002-2004, Mountjoy 2001-2004). 
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The data is provided in the form of design specifications of the robotic design that is 
associated with each of the contestant teams. The `consistency in repeated 
measurements' across source sites supports the reliability of the secondary data used 
(Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Two adjustments in the data set have been done. The 
first is that the differences across data sources in terms of measurement units have 
been converted to a standard. The second adjustment has been required due to data 
gaps, as in the unavailability of two indicators of design specifications from the ten 
listed for some of the deployed robotic designs. Given the need for uniformity, only 
eight of the ten consistently available indicators for design have been used as 
enumerated in table 3.1. The variables in the table refer to design features or strategic 
choices made to constitute the design configuration of machines deployed by 
contestant teams. Evidence from archival data in the form of narratives of contests, 
web postings and archival interviews has helped to structure and categorise some of 
the indicators outlined in table 1. Visual evidence (e. g. Mentom, 2002) of the 
televised contest-shows themselves has also been referred to for further refining the 
indicators. 
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Table 3.1: Design Features: Robotic Designs in Combat 
LABEL DESCRIPTION 
D1: Weight The weight of the machine in Kilograms 
D2: Size (Length) The length of the machine in Centimetres 
D3: Size (Width) The width of the machine in Centimetres 
D4: Size (Height) The height of the machine in Centimetres 
D5: Ground Clearance The ground clearance of the machine in Centimetres 
D6: Power Output The power output in Volts 
I D7: Type of Engine 
D8: Weapon Type 
The type of power for the engines has been classified into the 
following four categories: 
1. Adapted electric (from example: engines/motors for 
remote controlled cars and lawn mowers) 
2. Basic electric motors compiled for the robot from 
scratch/unspecified electric motors 
3. Petrol engines 
4. Industrial engines (mainly diesel engines) 
The weapon type has been classified into the following 
categories given the classification used across data for each 
design. 
1. Stabbing weapon 
2. Crushing weapon 
3. Cutting weapon 
4. Lifting-flipping weapon 
5. Slicing weapons [combine motion-impact and 
cutting, different to stabbing and drilling as in 
primarily referring the popular category of discs] 
6. Drilling weapons 
7. `Body Ramming' as the main weapon 
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3.6 Analysis and Results 
We use Unpaired T 
-Test (one way Analysis of Variance) to examine 
experimentation with design features across successive series in Robot Wars to 
test our hypotheses. The robotic designs of the `winning teams' or teams that win 
their respective heats are configured around the eight indicators of design as 
profiled in table 3.2. There are six such teams in the series 1, twelve in series 2 
and sixteen each in series 3 and series 4, as per the number of heats in each series. 
Table 3.2: Teams in the First Four Series of Robot Wars 




Series 1 32 6 
Series 2 72 12 
Series 3 128 16 
Series 4 96 16 
Statistically significant variations in design features over `pairs of series' indicate 
experimentation. There are three such pairs: series 1- series2, series 2- series 3, 
and series 3- series 4. The results show a reducing number of design features that 
are subjected to repeat experimentation over successive series (Figure 3.2). 
Over Series 1 and 2, which is the baseline comparison, five design features are 
experimented with (dl, d2, d3, d5, and d8). Of these five, three design features 
(dl, d2 and d3) are carried forward to the next comparison over series 2 and 3 for 
experimentation. In this comparison, two new design features (d4 and d6) also 
inhabit the experimentation space. In the final comparison between series 3 and 4 
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we find that only one of the design features (d3) is subjected to repeat 
experimentation and only one new feature (d6) inhabits the experimentation space. 
Consistent repeat experimentation with only one feature: the physical specification 
of width (d3) over the three comparisons could be for a whole host of reasons. For 
instance, the flip being embedded as the most effective tactic in combat over 
series, and teams countering it by reducing the width of their machines: 
streamlined shapes that offer a low cross-section for the flip becoming a pursued 
standard. 
Convergence to d3 as the one design element that is considered worthy of repeat 
experimentation, and a reducing number of design features being subjected to 
experimentation over the three comparisons, provides support for hypothesis 1. 
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Similar comparison using only the heat winners over successive series also shows 
a convergence. Type of engine (figure 3.3: d7) is the only design feature that is 
found to have been consistently experimented with over all three comparisons. 
This provides some support for hypothesis 2 by indicating convergence to repeat 
experimentation with a single design feature, interpreted as critical to 
performance. However, in contrast to the results for overall set of participant 
teams, the number of design features that have been experimented with over time 
is not declining for the heat winners. In the baseline comparison over series 1 and 
2, three design features are experimented with (dl, d3, and d7), in the next 
comparison over series 2 and 3, four design features are experimented with (d3, 
d7, d2, and d4) while in the final comparison, over series 3 and 4, the number of 
design features being experimented with are three (d7, dl, and d2). 
Also, in the final comparison for the heat winners, two new features are found to 
be experimented with, as against only one for the over all set of participant teams. 
This indicates a relatively higher propensity to explore new design features to 
experiment with by the heat winners. Convergence to simplicity in the case of the 
overall set of contestant teams is thus more rapid, and the successful teams 
characterised by a greater variety in experimentation, or in other words, a greater 
propensity to resist convergence pressures from performance feedback. These 
differences provide support for hypothesis 3. 
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The results for teams with critical recognition as in receiving special award 
nominations (Figure 3.4) are in sharp contrast to that for heat winners and the 
overall set of contestant teams. There are no design features that are consistently 
focussed upon for experimentation: every comparison sees a completely new set 
of features. 
This provides evidence for Hypothesis 4, and supports our assertion of a 
dichotomy between the institutional goal of entertainment through encouraging 
variety in experimentation through such nominations, and the convergence 
pressures towards simplicity based on combat performance. 
By the same token, this result draws attention to the differences in sensemaking 
that might characterise different agendas at different levels in the case of Robot 
Wars: diversity in designs at the institutional level given the goal of entertainment 
through deployment of novel and creative designs, and combat performance based 
convergence at the contestant level. 
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Our results show that convergence to simplicity is a phenomenon that characterises 
competitive environments. Results also suggest that efforts at striking a balance 
between simplicity and variety differentiates the winners from the `also-rans' i. e. that 
did not perform well in combat. By extension, this suggests that sustainable 
competitive advantage is not only about exploiting `past certainties' but also about 
keeping abreast of `future possibilities' (March, 1991). 
The distinction between winners and also-rans is well illustrated in how technological 
discontinuities have shaped organisational destinies (Utterback, 1994). These 
discontinuities are characterised by major shifts in product or process technologies 
and thus create a tension between protecting the status quo, as against harnessing the 
potential new technology has to offer. Initially new technologies often look limited in 
applicability and disruptive in orientation, and the risks of divergence seem to 
overshadow the potential in exploring new radical alternatives. 
For example, a sequence of discontinuities that marked the development of word 
processing machines clearly distinguished the survivors from those who perished. The 
former successfully walked the tightrope between ` exploiting past certainties' and 
`exploring future possibilities' (March, 1991) by moderating convergence pressures. 
While many other players in the typewriter industry perished, only one firm 
successfully moved on from the manual to the electric typewriter. This firm was 
IBM. As technologies moved on with the advent of the computer, IBM became the 
dominant player in the mainframe business, still adequately receptive to new frame 
re-shaping technologies. This allowed it to be more receptive to opportunities offered 
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by new technologies than its peers in a given generation of the word processing 
business. 
However, in the generation that followed, IBM was also rocked by a technology led 
transition when its response to the arrival of the personal computer was slow. The 
personal computer shook the mainframe business and also spelled the death of the 
IBM Selectrics typewriters. Eventually feedback from performance over time had 
managed to push IBM into the convergence trap as well. The belief in past 
technologies finally arrested its propensity to explore the new arrivals. 
This supports our assertion at the onset of this chapter that convergence is a natural 
consequence of performance feedback. While moderating convergence may lead to 
better performance, the resulting success usually brings with it a propensity to 
preserve it, again leading to convergence. 
The example also illustrates that performance feedback, especially from seminal 
events, has tremendous consequences for adaptability. Learning to moderate 
convergence pressures is key to survival and superior performance in competitive 
settings. 
Competitive performance tends to reaffirm faith in some parts of the strategic 
configuration and creates doubts about others. For instance, if product quality is rated 
as excellent but customer feedback shows that the product is not readily available, the 
interpretation is that while manufacturing is a source of competitive advantage 
something needs to be done about distribution. In this case, the usual response or the 
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first place to look for solutions is what the competitors are doing, and try to up the 
game to match their standards, mostly by imitating their modus-operandi subject to 
relative resourcing strength. 
Given over time experience with a strategic configuration, organisations tend to have 
greater faith in their knowledge about what can make a difference? This could be 
based on industry standards aspired for, or one's own realised sources of competitive 
advantage. The focus of efforts to experiment and out do competitors comes down to 
these selected features of strategic configuration. 
The need to challenge established assumptions is frequently ignored given this view 
that seeks a consistent process, or a system of innovation to deliver sustainable 
competitive advantage. The degree of effort that is required to do otherwise follows 
our understanding of why `double-loop learning' is so difficult (Argyris and Schon, 
1978). 
The idea of sustainable competitive advantage is at odds with imitation and search 
from amongst existing strategies. Literature suggests that it is not search and imitation 
but, learning to create and differentiate that lies at heart of achieving sustainable 
competitive advantage (Hamel and Prahlad, 1989; Peteraf, 1993). At a deeper level 
literature also suggests that seeking heterogeneity in causes for given performance is a 
richer source of learning to improve performance (Miner and Haunschild, 1995; 
Haunschild, 2002). 
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In our examination of the phenomenon of simplicity in the case of Robot Wars it is 
worthwhile to mention that Robot Wars ceased to be a show in its discussed format 
after seven series. Given the well positioned conflict for our research interest: that 
between the institutional agenda to induce variety in experimentation for 
entertainment, and the combat environment influencing a convergence to simplicity, it 
might be that simplicity stole the show: Robot Wars was probably no longer attractive 
enough to generate the required television ratings! 
In this chapter, the focus has been to examine convergence with reference to 
performance and design features. The next chapter looks at the robotic designs 
deployed by contestant teams over time to examine extent of change induced in such 
designs over successive series. Inertia and aspirations as a function of past 
performance and experience of contestant teams are seen to interact in moderating 
convergence. This interplay of the twin forces of inertia and aspirations is thus seen as 
a manifestation of strategic learning. 
63 
Chapter 4 
Inertia and Aspirations in Shaping Strategic 
Learning in Design Contests 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a study of strategic learning in the staged and managed 
competitive environment of the television series Robot Wars. We examine the two 
contrasting attributes of `inertia' and `aspirations' that shape strategic learning in 
such systems as their interaction moderates convergence as a consequence of 
performance feedback. Both of these attributes rely on past experience and 
performance. 
These two attributes that this chapter proposes as underpinning strategic learning are 
inherently in opposition. One is `inertia' that can be understood as the propensity to 
entrench the strategic configuration, or hold on to a configuration over successive 
generation of strategic events. The second is `aspirations', and can be understood as 
the propensity to experiment with and change the strategic configuration. We define 
measures of inertia and aspirations and discuss the impact of both on changes in 
strategic configurations. These are as manifested in the robotic designs deployed by 
contestant teams in Robot Wars the quasi-experimental settings we examined in the 
previous chapter to examine convergence as a consequence of performance feedback. 
In the research settings of Robot Wars, dynamics of rivalry are clearly demarcated 
into a generational sequence over successive series, and performance is clearly 
discernable with significant consequences for teams given the outcome of `win or 
loose'. We use data on 125 teams that participated in at least two of the seven series 
of Robot Wars to examine the interaction of inertia and aspiration in shaping strategic 
learning 
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In the section to follow, we outline a framework of strategic learning based on the 
premises of inertia and aspiration. This is followed by an elaboration of some key 
features of the research site that help contextualise the formulation of hypotheses 
thereafter. Thereafter design changes are examined as an indicator of strategic 
learning to test the hypotheses formulated in this chapter. Our results from multiple 
regression analysis show that strategic learning is shaped by an interaction between 
the opposing forces of inertia and aspirations. We conclude with a discussion of the 
interaction of behavioural and cognitive explanations of strategic learning 
4.2 Propensity to Change Continuum: Inertia and Aspirations 
The concept of inertia has found place in discussions on organisational and industry 
evolution (Hannan and Freeman, 1977,1984), in discussing the impact of positive 
feedback in making it difficult to change strategic direction (Wright and Goodwin, 
1999; Burgelman, 2002), and in investigating organisational learning (Levinthal, 
1997). The specific use of organisational inertia as a disposition that influences the 
capacity to change is strongly linked to the theory of organisational routines (Cohen 
and Bacdayan, 1994). 
When inertia is the dominant force in organisations, the tendency to change is arrested 
by the disposition to hold on to the existing configuration. Organisations respond to 
performance by reinforcing what worked best in the past, rather than exploring 
alternatives configurations that may lead to even better performance. Put differently, 
the literature sees an implicit incompatibility between inertia and exploration. 
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Aspirations on the other hand relate to the tendency of organisations to see a given 
strategic configuration as the basis for experimentation and further improvement. 
Unlike inertia which is strongly behavioural in orientation, aspirations are more 
cognition based. The relationship between aspirations and performance, and by 
implication, the mismatch between aspirations and performance, is often seen as 
crucial for superior performance (Starbuck, 1963; Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal 
and March 1981). Aspirations have been used to inform the propensity to take risks 
(March and Shapira, 1992) and to reflect on organisational change (Greve, 1988). 
Thus, in contrast to inertia, aspirations are seen as compatible with exploration. 
In the case of inertia the learning focuses on current routines and practices, and more 
generally on the effectiveness of the current configuration that has emerged over time. 
On the other hand, aspirations stem from short-term experiences that trigger 
exploration for changing existing ways of operating and decision making and thus 
tend to inhibit the propensity to converge. As in the case of inertia, aspirations are also 
strongly self-referential: individuals and organisations use their own past performance 
as a basis for adjusting or further developing their aspirations. However, unlike 
inertia which is overwhelmingly self-referential, research suggests that aspirations 
may also be strongly influenced by comparisons to other reference individuals or 
reference groups. Individuals and organisations often condition their aspirations as a 
function of rivals, competitors, or the industry group to which they belong 
(Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995). Thus, when it comes to aspirations we can make a 
distinction between self-aspirations and competitive-aspirations. Self-aspirations are 
shaped by using one's own past performance as a benchmark for setting aspirations, 
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while competitive-aspirations are shaped by benchmarking the performance of rivals 
against one's own performance. 
4.3 The Contest Environment of Robot Wars 
In the earlier chapter we introduced Robot Wars as a tournament-style competition. 
Here we present some key features of the contest to contextualise our formulation of 
hypotheses and variables in the sections to follow. As discussed, the teams and their 
respective robotic designs, progress through multiple stages that comprise several 
combat-shows to the final where the series winner is decided. Each contestant team 
can be regarded as a learning unit, and each series is therefore considered as a 
learning episode. The goal of Robot Wars is to provide spectator entertainment by 
encouraging novel and nascent robotic designs in combat. We also know from the 
discussion in the previous chapter that each Robot Wars contest series is arranged in 
stages. Each stage is made up of one or several battles, where contestant teams pit 
their designs against each other. Losing a battle in the contest results in elimination 
from the contest, with the winner advancing to the next stage in the competition. 
The number of participant teams varies over successive series of the contest and 
therefore, so do the number of battles that are featured in different series. For 
consistency in comparison of performance each series has been divided into four 
progressive stages. The final stage or fourth stage is the series final where the eventual 
series winner is decided. Appendix A presents the charts for progression in each of 
the seven series of Robot Wars. The contest takes place under clearly formulated 
rules. The rules have been codified by contest organisers with the assistance of 
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experienced robotiers. These rules govern design specifications and competition as 
follows: 
" Specifications within which the designs are to be created, for example 
thresholds of physical dimensions and weight. 
" Specifications that regulate engine power, type, and types of weaponry 
that are allowed or prohibited, for example flame throwers and 
weapons that shatter are not allowed. 
" Specifications of the arena in which the combat takes place. This 
includes arena dimensions and placement of hazards. 
" Rules of combat such as criteria for scoring points and time limit for a 
combat. 
The robotic combat takes place in an enclosed arena. The arena has special features 
that presents hazards but also creates tactical options for the contestants. Matches are 
frequently decided by a knock-out that is sometimes caused by damage sustained 
during combat, and at other times is a result of a major malfunction such as engine 
failure. The contest rules do not allow teams to make changes to the design during a 
series itself, apart from repairs that may be required to address damage sustained in 
combat that are necessary for a design's operability in the next stage of the contest 
series. There is a time limit for the duration of the combat. If there is no clear cut 
outcome at the end of this set time, judges comprising mainly of experienced 
robotiers, decide the winner based on criteria of attacks made and damage delivered. 
The robots deployed in combat are designed with different features of weaponry, 
engine power, and physical dimensions within the scope of the rules specified for 
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each contest series. They are remotely controlled by the respective robotiers who 
operate in glass boxes perched at a level higher than the arena. A remote controlled 
ref-robot, or referee, is also there to supervise the combat. The house robots, remote 
operated by house robotiers or robot, are positioned at the ends of the combat arena. 
They have a dual role: to intervene and control combat when necessary, and to make 
the contest more interesting by creating hazards for the contestants. House robots 
therefore attack battling robots when they stray too close to the ends of the arena, or 
when they fail to follow the instructions of the ref-robot. 
Performance in Robot Wars is judged by the performance of a contestant team's 
robotic design. This is understood as success in combat by the deployed design, and 
is manifested in the progress a team makes during a contest series. There is a cash 
prize associated with winning in combat and progressing in the contest series. 
In addition to competitive performance, another measure of performance is the 
popularity of the competing teams or `popular appeal', as measured by the number of 
special award nominations a team receives in a contest series. 
Unlike competitive performance which is objectively determined from the outcome of 
combat in Robot Wars, such nominations are generated by web-based forums that we 
outlined in the previous chapter. Each forum has its own choice of teams for different 
nominations, and most take into account the views of contest organisers, show 
presenters, and also the views of select audience that may choose to participate in 
such forums. 
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Special award nominations are given for different categories. Some of these 
categories deal with performance during the contest. These may be regarded as 
`operational' in the sense that they are recognition for expertise in the use of the 
robots. Other categories, however, are granted for the quality and features of the 
design. Because design change is our strategic variable we confined our data to these 
alone. These categories include the following: 
" Nominations for the Most Original Design: Given to teams that introduce 
innovative design elements to the contest like a new armour, a new type of 
weapon (e. g. flipper, hammer, cutting disc etc), or say an attractive physical shape 
within the size specifications of the rules. 
" Nominations for the Best Weapon: Given to robotic designs with the most 
effective /damage-causing weapon. 
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4.4 Hypotheses 
Strategic learning in Robot Wars takes place against the background of accumulated 
experience over successive generations, or series of the contest. Though nearly half 
the teams in the sample participated in only two contest series, and only about one 
fifth of the teams participated in more than three contest series, Robot Wars 
constitutes a community in which ideas are shared and learning is collective as well as 
individual. 
Because participants in Robot Wars are prohibited from making design changes 
during the series, they can only put this learning to use in the aftermath of one series, 
and prior to the next. Changes made to the design in function of these learning have 
all the hallmarks of strategic decisions: they require major investment of resources, 
and are difficult to reverse once the design is put into action. From a methodological 
point of view they have the added advantage of being openly declared, verified, and 
thus easy to observe. 
Design changes that are implemented in contest series N+1 are the product of 
competitive experience in the previous series N. Decisions to change design in the 
aftermath of series N are influenced by competitive performance in that series. The 
accepted indicator of competitive performance is how far the team reached in series 
N. This may either be the stage at which it was eliminated, or if it won the series, the 
total number of contests. Thus, if strategic learning is influenced by self-aspiration, 
we would expect teams to change designs in N+1 in line with their own competitive 
performance in series N. This gives us the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: With generational experience as a baseline, strategic learning by 
individual teams will be influenced by self-aspirations as measured by competitive 
performance in last series. 
The interpretation of competitive performance is comprised not only of the team's 
own performance but also of the benchmarking of this performance to that of its 
competitors, especially those whose performance had a direct impact on their own 
performance. Consistent with the aspiration as a driving force, we would expect 
teams to benchmark their performance against direct rivals to which they lost in the 
previous series. Inevitably, the better these competitors perform in series N, the more 
this performance is likely to influence aspirations and hence design change decisions 
in series N+1. This gives us the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: With generational experience as a baseline, strategic learning by 
individual teams will be influenced by competitive-aspirations derived from the 
performance of their direct competitors in the last series. 
Teams are influenced by past experience in two ways. First, they are influenced by 
the cumulative historical experience generated by the contests. Second, teams learn 
directly from their own recent experience with special emphasis on the last contest in 
which they participated. Longer contest participation and superior performance are 
likely to increase inertial tendency, which in turn reduces the incentives to change 
design. By contrast, a shorter experience horizon and poorer performance is likely to 
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encourage experimentation and lead to greater willingness to engage in radical 
change. This gives us the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: With generational experience as a baseline, strategic learning by 
individual teams will be influenced by inertia as measured by the number of series 
and competitive performance in these series. 
As we noted earlier, the pervasive assumption in organisational research is that inertia 
and aspirations operate in opposite direction. In the present context, this means that 
we may expect the impact of strategic learning on design decisions in series N+1 will 
be a product of an interaction between inertia and aspirations in series N. This gives 
us the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: With generational experience as a baseline, strategic learning by 
individual teams will be influenced by a negative interaction between inertia and 
aspirations. 
Finally, in addition to competitive performance as determined in the arena, team 
performance is also evaluated by the audience. Popular appeal indicated by special 
award nominations in series N is therefore an alternative measure of performance. 
Teams may be influenced by the potential economic benefits that may result from 
popular appeal, or may be simply motivated by the intrinsic rewards that come with 
recognition. Popular appeal may therefore influence strategic learning and thus have 
an impact on design changes. This gives us the hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 5: With generational experience as a baseline, strategic learning by 
individual teams will be influenced by popular appeal of a contestant team. 
4.5 Data and Variables 
4.5.1 Data 
In this chapter our analysis is based in the main on a purposive sample of 125 
contestant teams from a population of 389 teams in Robot Wars over the seven contest 
series. The sampling includes all teams that participated in more than one of the 
seven contest series. Each successive series, before and after, in which contestant 
team participated is one observation. The total number of such observations that 
inform our analyses is 191. 
Fourteen teams that meet the criteria of participation and continuity have been 
excluded due to missing data on the specifications of the robotic design, and a further 
four have been excluded due to drastic reshaping of the contestant teams that created 
doubts about continuity of the design. Appendix A presents the charts for progression 
in each of the seven series of Robot Wars. 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, archival data over seven successive series of 
the Robot Wars contest and spanning five years, from 1998 to 2003, are available 
from web-based and archival sources like Tectonic Robot Wars web site: 
http: //www. tectonic. force9. co. uk, and Robots Rule web site: http: //www. btinternet. 
com/ patricks. web/robots. The data is provided in the form of design specifications of 
the robotic design that is associated with each of the contestant teams. The narrative 
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of the battles is also provided for each team's robotic design and further qualitative 
data on reactions and comments of the contestant teams and show presenters is 
available from archival audio-visual sources. 
4.5.2 Variables and Measures 
4.5.2.1 Dependent Variable: Strategic learning measured on the basis of Design 
Chi 
DC 
+i: Design change in series `N+1 ' as an indicator of strategic learning represents 
the dependent variable for this study. As discussed, this refers to the changes in design 
made in aftermath of a contest series. Our coding of design change here is based on 
combing change in different design features for a perspective on the overall scope and 
extent of change in the robotic design, or strategic configuration 
Design Change (DC) has been coded from 1 to 4, according to increasing magnitude 
of change in the design configuration as follows: 
  
DC=1: Design change in physical specifications only. This refers to changes 
in the physical dimensions and weight of the deployed design. 
  
DC=2: Design change only in functional specifications, or specifications of 
design that are cited in relation to combat performance in narratives of the 
contest. Examples of these are ground clearance, weapon, and engine power. 
  
DC=3: Design change where both physical and functional specifications 
change but the changes are closely interrelated. For example, the team changes 
the weapon (functional feature) of its deployed design from a flipper to a 
hammer, but the change in associated height (physical feature) of the design is 
largely attributable to this change of weapon. 
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DC=4: Design change where both physical and functional specifications 
change but the changes are unrelated. To illustrate, we can again take the 
example of a team that changes the weapon (functional feature) of its deployed 
design from a flipper to a hammer. Though the change in associated height 
(physical feature) of the design in this case is largely attributable change in 
weapon, we find that the deployed design is also characterised by a changes in 
its length and width (physical features), which is not due to the change in 
weapon. 
4.5.2.2 Control Variable: Contest Generation 
Each successive contest series can be seen as a generation that brings with it a pool of 
accumulated experiences from participation in previous series or contest generations. 
We code this history of generations as Contest Generation (Gn). Contest generation 
is coded as `1' for the succession from series 1-series 2, `2' for series 2-series 3 and so 
on, until 6 for the succession from series 6- series 7. Thus, a team that is represented 
by `2' in this coding schema has participated in series 1, series2 and series 3. 
Similarly, a team that is represented by `6' has a longest heredity chain, having 
participated in all seven series. 
4.5.2.3 Independent Variables 
We use two different types of performance measures to operationalise our 
independent variables: competitive performance as determined by combat and 
performance by popular appeal measured by nominations received. 
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Competitive performance has been coded as `1' if the team exits from the first stage 
of the contest series; `2' if the team progresses to subsequent rounds but does not 
reach the semi-finals; `3' if the team reaches the semi-finals but is not the eventual 
series winner, and finally 4 if the team wins the series. 
In what follows we discuss our aspirations and inertia measures. As we discus below, 
we distinguish between three types of aspirations. The first, self-aspiration, is 
defined with respect to the team's own past competitive performance. The second, 
competitive-aspiration, is based on comparison with the rival the team lost to, 
resulting in the team's elimination from the contest series. The third is aspiration that 
results from popular appeal of a contestant team in a contest series. Our inertia 
measure, by contrast, combines competitive performance and past participation 
experience. 
Sel, spirations by competitive performance from series N. " (SA) 
Self-aspirations imply shaping future orientation to design change based on a 
contestant team's own performance. Contestant teams try to achieve higher 
competitive performance in the next series. At a minimum this suggests achieving a 
well-defined incremental improvement in the next opportunity. In the setting of 
`Robot Wars' this can be equated to going one stage further in N+1 series relative to 
the stage reached in series N. 
To calculate aspirations based on prior performance we used Laplace's law of 
succession (Howson and Urbach, 1988; Hsu and Knoblock, 1995). Laplace's law of 
succession applies to processes which are history dependent, especially where there is 
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a relatively short history on which to base future expectations. For example, if a 
researcher conducts an experiment with two possible outcomes, A or B, and obtains 
A, Laplace's law of succession can be used to calculate the expectation that she will 
obtain A the next time the experiment is carried out. 
In the context of Robot Wars we used Laplace's law of succession to calculate the 
expectations of teams based on prior contest experience. As can be recalled, each 
stage in contest series can have two possible outcomes: win or lose, with a loss 
resulting in elimination from the series. Each team is either eliminated in stage n of 
the series (n=1 to 4), or it emerges as the overall winner of the series at n=4. 
Laplace's law of succession can be used to calculate the expectations that a team 
eliminated at stage n of the series can avoid elimination at the same stage `n' in the 
following series, thus minimally reaching the `n+l' stage in the succeeding series. 
More generally, if a team has been in `n' stages in a previous series, and has won 
through `r' stages, we take the expectations that it will win in stage `n' and reach 
stage `n+l' to be: E(r)= (r+l)/(n+k), where k=2 (i. e. win/lose) (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1: Self-aspirations Calculations 
'n' is the stage r ached in a given contest series 
'r' is the number of stages the team has won through to progress in the given 
contest series (: nfor the series winner and, <n for all other teams in the 
series) 
'E(r)' isthe xpectation of winning stage'n' in the next contest series for a 
team eliminated  stage'n' in the given series (expectation of winning the next 
series in the case ofthe series winner) 
E(r) = (r+f)I(ri+k) where k=2 
Winner 
q1 q2 q3 q4 
n12344 
r01234 
E(r) 113 19 36 20 56 
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Competitive-aspirations by competitive erformance from series N- (CA) 
Competitive-aspirations are based on the overall performance of a rival, to which a 
team lost, leading to elimination, as a reference point for forming aspirations when 
getting ready for the next series. We use Laplace's law of succession (essentially as 
in self-aspiration), but this time we calculate aspiration levels of the rival relative to 
the aspiration level of the contestant team. 
The greater the gap between the reference team's performance and the rival's 
performance the greater will be the competitive-aspirations of the reference contestant 
team and is measured as: For example, if team A loses to team B in stage `1' of a 
contest series N and team B proceeds in the series to be eventually win the series 
competitive-aspirations for team A as from figure 2 will be given by: CA "= [(5/6) / 
(1/3)J 
= 2.5. On the other hand if team B was to be eliminated in stage `4' of the 
contest series the competitive-aspirations for team A will be: CA 
A = [(2/3)1(1/3)] 
=2. Competitive-aspirations in the first case is greater than competitive-aspirations in 
the second, which is consistent with our argument that the greater the gap between the 
winner and the loser in terms of competitive performance in a contest series, the 
higher is the losing team's competitive aspiration. 
Aspirations by Popular Appeal from series N. " (PA) 
Achievement in a contest series is also seen as popularity of a contestant team in the 
contest series. This performance indicator of popular appeal is seen as a function of 
the count of special award nominations received, and of the stage reached by the team 
in a contest series. This is because in addition to nominations, popular appeal is also a 
function of the visibility of a contestant team in the overall population of teams that 
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participate in a contest series. Given the elimination structure of Robot Wars, 
contestant teams that survive, end up in more shows. Consequently, these stand out by 
way of being in a progressively smaller set of teams as the contest progresses. 
We code the variable of popular appeal as a product of stage reached in a given 
contest series and the number of nominations received in that series. For example, if 
team A reaches stage `2' of the contest series and the count of nominations received 
by this team is `3', the popular appeal score for the team will be: [2 *3=6]. On the 
other hand, if another team B reaches stage `3' of the same contest series and receives 
the same number of popular appeal nominations the popular appeal score for the team 
will be [3 *3=9]. Though the number of nominations received by both teams in the 
contest series are equal, team B's popular appeal is higher by the factor of its greater 
visibility. In the aftermath of the contest series team B is likely to be characterised by 
relatively greater acclaim for the attractiveness and novelty of its design. We use 
standardised scores in our analysis and base the standardisation on the maximum 
achievable score. 
Inertia (IN) 
As we discussed earlier, in contrast with aspirations, inertia is overwhelmingly self 
referential. The impact of inertia on strategic learning is to reduce willingness or 
ability to experiment and innovate with new designs. As teams fine-tune their 
operating skills 
- 
for example, as they master the remote driving skills of a design 
with particular physical dimensions and engine power - they are reluctant to alter the 
basic design, especially if it is associated with strong performance. 
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$. 
We code inertia as a product of direct experience, or number of series participated in 
by a contestant team (till stage N), and the performance of the deployed design, or the 
stage it reaches in the contest series N. For example, if a contestant team A has 
participated in `3' contest series, and has an average competitive performance in terms 
of stages reached over the series of 12' the inertia score for the team will be: [2*3=61. 
Similarly another team B having lesser participation experience say of `2', contest 
series and the same average score will have an inertia score of [2*2=4]. The inertia 
score of team B is less than team A which is consistent with our argument. Similarly 
with same level of participation experience of two teams, the greater average 
competitive performance for one team will give a higher score for inertia for that 
team. We use standardised scores in our analysis and base the standardisation on the 
maximum achievable score. 
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4.6 Analysis and Results 
We use correlations and multiple regression analysis to test the hypotheses. To begin 
with, simultaneous regression was done for the control variable and the main effects. 
This was then expanded hierarchically by including the interaction effects to yield the 
full model. 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for all the variables included in this study. The 
generational experience is significantly correlated with most of the variables. There is 
a significant correlation between design change which is the indicator of strategic 
learning, and competitive-aspirations by competitive performance. This indicates that 
changes in design are associated with aspirations informed by past competitive 
performance, and relative achievement of the competitors. Correlation between 
design change and inertia is also significant indicating an association between design 
change and inertia based on past performance and participation experience. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
Pearson Correlations 
Variables Mean StdDev DC n+l Gn SA(n) CA(n) IN(n) PA(n) 
Design 
Change: DC(n+1) 






-0.11 -0.08 1.00 
Competitive-aspirations: CA 




-0.17 0.37 0.30 -0.18 1.00 
Aspirations by Popular Appeal: PA 
0.29 0.47 
-0.10 -0.08 0.22 -0.13 -0.04 1.00 
' Correlations at 0.12 or higher are significant at the 0.05 level 
Sample size: 191. 
84 
Regression results in table 4.2 provide some support for Hypothesis 1. Self- 
aspirations that are based on competitive performance encourage design changes in 
interaction with competitive-aspirations by competitive performance (table 4.2: model 
3). Competitive-aspirations by competitive performance are the dominant predictor of 
design changes among the main effects (table 4.2: model 1) providing considerable 
support for Hypothesis 2. These results suggest that self-aspirations have less impact 
on the propensity to change design than competitive-aspirations. In the case of 
competitive-aspirations teams often use more successful rivals as a reference, and this 
in turn promotes more radical design change. In absence of a competitive reference, 
teams are likely to modify designs only incrementally. This will be typical of an 
inertial tendency shown by say the winner of a series that does not have a competitive 
reference (rival it lost to! ) though its self-aspiration is very high as it seeks to replicate 
its success in competitive performance in this series for the next series. 
The baseline variable of generational experience is shown to inhibit design changes in 
all models reported in table 4.2. This is an indication that over time such experience 
allows teams to isolate features that work well in the contest environment and changes 
become increasingly focussed on a lesser set of design characteristics. This result is 
also a validation of our results from the preceding chapter where we found evidence 
for convergence to simplicity in experimentation. 
We find considerable support for hypothesis 3 that against the baseline of generational 
experience inertia influences design changes. We argued that inertia may not 
necessarily inhibit design changes but may work to reduce the scope of such changes. 
85 
Our results show that inertia encourages design changes (table 4.2: model 4 to model 
7) possibly by informing teams of what works and what does not when they make 
choices about altering design characteristics. 
Inertia interacts negatively with self-aspirations (table 4.2: model 4) and with 
competitive-aspirations (table 4.2: model 4 to Model 7) providing substantial evidence 
for Hypothesis 4. Inertia works to moderate aspirations, thereby reducing the scope of 
design changes given past competitive performance and experience of contestant 
teams'. It tends to support the propensity to reduce scope, narrowing down to fewer 
incremental changes rather than radical changes that can address aspired performance 
in the future. 
We do not find support for Hypothesis 5; aspirations by popular appeal do not seem to 
affect design change. However, there is a significant negative interaction between 
aspirations induced by popular appeal and inertia (table 4.2: model 5 to model 7) that 
influence design change. In conjunction with the evidence on reduction in design 
changes over successive generations of the contest series discussed earlier, this result 
provides for an interesting perspective on the role of popular appeal nomination in 
Robot Wars: Given that the objective of Robot Wars as a game show is to provide 
entertainment through deployment of novel and attractive designs in combat, and that 
novelty is likely to be reduced as changes and experimentation decreases, popular 
appeal through special award nominations may be an institutional mechanism 
implemented to encourage experimentation and produce greater diversity in designs. 
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Our results suggest that the combined effects of past experience and past performance 
will encourage inertia: teams with longer experience and better performance are more 
likely to avoid major design change. Aspirations, in particular competitive- 
aspirations, had the opposite impact: encouraging design change. The interplay of 
these two forces clearly moderates convergence. While inertia by itself supports 
convergence, aspirations counter inertial tendencies by drawing attention to what can 
be achieved by change. 
The gap between the rank achieved by a team, and the rank achieved by the 
competitor to whom it lost in the previous series, forms the basis of competitive- 
aspirations. Consequently, the higher is the team's own performance relative to 
rivals, the less design changes it will implement. At the same time, the greater the 
gap between a team's own performance and the performance of its victorious rival, 
the higher is the competitive reference to which it will aspire. 
We also examined popularity of a team's design; based on the special award 
nominations it gets 
- 
in effect this may be regarded as `critical acclaim' for a design 
much as one has critical acclaim in artistic performances (Eliashberg and Shugart, 
1997). Popularity seems to reduce the inertial tendency of contestant teams. Our 
observation of the contest environment suggests that this opposition may have been 
induced by the performance mechanism of popular appeal due to a potential conflict 
between the contest goal of entertainment which is best served by encouraging design 
diversity. This also provides a partial perspective on interpretation of causality by 
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engaging the idea of multiple rationales for performance assessment or rationales that 
guide reasons behind realised performance: combat performance and popular appeal. 
The framework of inertia and aspiration provides a novel perspective to research in 
the area of strategic learning. The interplay of these two premises as the tension 
between behavioural and cognitive explanations for strategic learning also reflects on 
the interface between the dominant logics in organisational literature, that of ecology 
and strategy, the former favouring inert organisations, and the latter favouring 
flexibility and change (Baum et al., 2006 ). More importantly, this interplay shapes 
organisational sensemaking for generating actionable feedback to moderate 
convergence pressures that performance brings with it. 
In the next chapter we examine Hollywood movie-sequels in the conventional 
industry settings of motion pictures. This is to provide external validity to our 
empirical model that posits interaction between inertia and aspirations as shaping 
strategic learning by moderating convergence in light of past performance and over 
time experience. In the quasi-experimental settings of Robot Wars, robotic designs 
deployed by teams are proxies for organisational strategic configurations: an analogy 
that has been frequented in research examining organisational learning (e. g. Senge, 
1990; O'Brien and Buono, 1996; Ellerman, 1999; Edmondson, 1999). 
We continue using this analogy in the following chapter, where we examine strategic 
learning in the non-experimental settings of sequential project systems of movie 
sequels. However, in comparison to Robot Wars they have much nuanced distinction 
between the team, and the design it deploys as a movie in the competitive arena viz. 
the market. This is an example of the influence of distinguishing characteristics that 
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one is likely to encounter in real world business settings. Though in the next chapter 
we transcend from quasi-experimental settings to probably the other extreme, non- 
experimental settings of a creative industry, we keep our examination focussed on 




Learning from Strategic Experiences in 
Sequential Project Systems: The Case of 
Hollywood Movie Sequels 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have modelled design changes as a function of 
performance based inertia and aspirations in the quasi experimental settings of Robot 
Wars. This we posit to be a manifestation of strategic learning, or learning shaped by 
interplay between inertia and aspirations to moderate convergence. In this chapter we 
examine the sequential project system of `movie sequels' to provide external validity 
to the strategic learning model that emerged from the previous chapter. We examine 
consecution of learning over successive movies 
- 
each movie being subject to actions 
stemming from performance feedback of the previous movies that characterise a 
lineage of sequels. Strategic learning is shaped by the interplay of inertia and 
aspirations that affect changes in a movie's key design elements. These design choices 
relate to the movie's plot, and characters that enact the plot. 
We first contextualise theoretical underpinnings to our examination of strategic 
learning in Hollywood movie sequels with theatrical release in the United States over 
the period 1960-2005. This is followed by a perspective on how movie sequels are 
shaped. After this, we develop hypotheses and provide an elaboration on the measures 
and analysis used to test the hypotheses. The penultimate section of this chapter 
discusses the results from analysis, and the chapter closes by a discussion on the 
implications of our findings. 
5.2 Strategic Learning in Movie Sequels 
A movie sequel can be understood as a work of fiction in film, that is produced after a 
completed work, and is set in the same universe but at a later time. It usually 
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continues the elements of the first story, often with the same characters, although this 
is not always the case. 
The latter part of this conceptualisation refers to a movie series or franchise that is a 
weaker form of a sequel in terms of continuation of the narrative. In the empirical 
study presented in this chapter we account for this aspect by controlling for the 
number of movies in a sequel-series and the time difference between successive 
movies. Furthermore, all `sequelogies' (Sequelogue, 2005) are step-built i. e. the 
number of movies are not pre-planned nor shot before the release of the predecessor. 
This is a crucial distinction of `sequels' from the conventional understanding of a 
`series' like television soaps. 
We have discussed that strategic learning as a process of knowledge formation 
enhances the ability of organisations to effectively foreshadow and manage future 
events. This is by moderating convergence from performance feedback to strike a 
balance between convergence and exploration to modify the strategic configuration. 
We have also asserted that the interpretation of experience and the actions such 
interpretation may lead to is both behavioural and cognitive in orientation. As 
discussed earlier in this dissertation, we postulate that interpretation of strategic 
experiences and their subsequent impact is shaped by two forces that capture these. 
The first is inertia, understood as the propensity to entrench or hold on to the same 
strategic configuration over time (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Greve, 1988; 
Levinthal, 1997). The second is aspirations understood as the propensity to 
experiment with and change the strategic configuration (Starbuck, 1963; Cyert and 
March, 1963; Levinthal and March 1981; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). 
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Inertia and aspirations can be seen as specific manifestations of the enactment of 
strategic learning and realised changes in the strategic configuration are an indicator 
of strategic learning. We have argued that literature sees an inherent opposition 
between inertia and aspirations. In general, aspiration may be seen to describe a 
`change prone' future orientation of individuals and organisations while inertia can be 
seen as working to reduce the scope of change, or ascribe to a `retention prone' future 
orientation. The level of aspirations, unlike inertia, is less ingrained in over time 
emergence of rules, routines and practices. It is more fickle and is arguably a function 
of short-term performance. 
For instance, a good box office performance of a sequel may conjecture an action to 
make minimal changes in a successful design that has emerged over time. 
Alternatively, it may provide the necessary confidence to risk alterations in design 
features in the expectation to improve performance even further in the next sequel. 
Further, an exceptional performance of another movie that rivalled a given feature in 
the same competitive space and time may result in a focus on changes to exploit 
design elements, like say, a car stunt in the rival feature that is a hit with the audience. 
Thus, while inertia is overwhelmingly self referential, aspirations are both self and 
comparative. It suggests that though inertia and aspirations are inherently in 
opposition, when it comes to change in response to learning from past experiences, a 
comparative reference like that of a rival may also help in constraining change to only 
a few imitable characteristics. On the other hand, self-aspirations may induce more 
sweeping changes as they are not influenced by a competitive reference. 
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5.3 Shaping a Movie Sequel 
In 1916 when the first Hollywood sequel Fall of a Nation hit theatres no one could 
have predicted that `sequelogy' (Sequelogue, 2005) was going to become such an 
adored Hollywood tradition to cash on success, or on unfulfilled expectations of 
returns from a feature. Typically, Fall of a Nation followed the landmark feature Birth 
of a Nation, characterised by `path breaking innovations in editing, cinematography 
and narrative technique' (IMDb, 2006), but did not make enough money to fulfil the 
aspirations of the makers who were expecting more returns for the innovations. 
It is not uncommon to find movie sequels being characterised as being low on novel 
and creative content. This assertion is not always true, but may hold ground in cases 
where design changes are overtly constrained by trying to preserve attributes 
interpreted as contributing to the success of the original, and change is held to a bare 
mimimum to continue the narrative. However, in other cases, the dominant change 
mandate is to address any weaknesses in the original. For instance, the film Star Trek: 
The Motion Picture was criticised for being too tedious on the narrative. In reaction, 
Paramount Pictures got in shape a sequel that addressed the criticisms: Star Trek II. - 
The Wrath of Khan. 
There are script and character programming issues that are central to design of 
sequels. Sometimes, the original film deliberately has loose threads in the narrative 
that help shape a sequel. For example, in the movie Spider-Man the hero rejects the 
leading lady's advances and conceals his identity without explaining that this would 
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protect her from his enemies. This ending is not really intended to be tragic but is a 
means to continue the narrative in Spiderman II, where the curtained relationship 
between the lead characters is at the core of the new plot. 
In the movie Jaws, there are no loose threads in the narrative to latch on to for making 
of a sequel, and several have been been rather successfully made. Here, the family in 
the shark terror was cleverly labelled as `jinxed' in the following movies. The original 
regular protective mom progressed over sequels to be a grandmother obsessed with 
the belief that her family was being targeted by a vengeful dark shadow in the waters. 
In franchise features like the James Bond movies, Indiana Jones and Mad Max, the 
character is the mainstay and the plot does not need to latch on its predeccessor's 
ending, or alternatively, create a nuanced connection between the plot and the 
character. The plot is fairly novel in terms of new challenges that confront the 
character albeit, with a generous retention of the attributes that define the character, 
whether it is the fancy Bond arsenal, his womanising, or even more subtle aspects 
like the famous Bond line `shaken not stirred' 
. 
In movies that commit in their `labelling' to a character, sequel identity is locked with 
the character. For example, Indiana Jones movies, or less explcilty, movies like Die- 
Hard where John McClane remains a character movie-goers seem to expect in 
sequels. However, the scope for Die-Hard makers to replace McClane by another 
character remains much higher than replacing Indiana Jones ` in' Indiana Jones 
movies. This has important implications for how sequels are designed and the design 
space they have to fiddle with. 
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The movie cast that live the characters tend to follow the progressive narrative over 
sequels, for example, when the boy grows up in the sequel to become a man, or if 
someone (as per the script) ends up inside the shark as in the case film Jaws, it 
usually ends the possiblility of the character, and thus, the cast that played it, to find a 
place in the sequel. A change in casting may also be led by change in plot in the case 
of franchise sequels where continuation of the narrative is not central. For instance, 
the change in the casting of James Bond from Pierce Brosnan to Daniel Craig is led 
by a shift in the plot for the new Bond feature Casino Royale that finds Bond at the 
start of his career. Given the aging Brosnan, who has already been in four Bond 
features, the plot demanded a fresh face. Thus we make a case for a movie's design 
comprising the plot and characters as influencing one element of the movie team, 
namely casting. 
However, team level dynamics in movie-projects have been examined in literature as 
significant influencers of design change, if not design elements themselves (Schwab 
and Miner, 2001; Shamsie et al., 2004). Entities comprising a movie project team are 
numerous, and extant literature suggests that the cluster comprising direction, cast, 
screenplay and roles, leads the list (e. g. Taylor, 1967; Paul, 1979; Lampel 2005; 
Simonton, 2002,2004). Such research argues seamlessly between team composition 
and design of a movie based on the tension between creativity and financial risk, and 
associated shifting of the locus of project control in movie making, among other 
dimensions (e. g. Glynn, 2000; Lampel, 2005; Shamsie, 2005). 
In this chapter we do not examine team level dynamics as the intention is to look at 
performance based inertia and aspirations in shaping design changes in movie sequels: 
design change being understood as changes in the movie as a product approximated 
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by change in the plot and characters that enact the plot. Furthermore, this perspective 
is also ideal for external validity to our examination of strategic learning in the case of 
Robot Wars in the preceding chapters. There also, we do not engage team level 
dynamics and examine changes in the deployed robotic design. Understandably, it is 
the teams that learn, but the learning is manifested in the design changes they induce. 
5.4 Hypotheses 
Performance of a theatrical release is central to shaping a future sequel: whether it 
will be radically altered, or just enough, to keep the narrative going. Such 
performance can be looked at in two main ways: the commercial success by way of 
box-office performance, and critical success that stems from awards and nominations 
a movie gets whether at film festivals or other award ceremonies. 
Over time, box-office performance of movies in a sequelogy is likely to embody a 
belief about some attributes of the script and characters as being central to the identity 
of the sequels and also, to the audience appeal for the sequelogy. This belief may 
work to reduce the scope of design changes. This gives us the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Strategic learning in movie-sequels will be influenced by inertia based 
on over time (average) box-ofce performance of prior movies in the sequelogy 
Box-office performance of a movie is also a basis for movie-makers to aspire for even 
better returns from a sequel. We have argued that in contrast to inertia, aspirations 
stem from short-term performance. Thus, these tend to result in actions that lie outside 
the trajectory propounded by embedded routinues and practices, and by extension, 
focus attention outside the confines of the existing strategic configuration to explore 
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new inputs. They are likely to influence change to build on the success through such 
exploration, or alternatively, address failure by radical changes. This gives us the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Strategic learning in movie-sequels will be influenced by self- 
aspirations based on box-office performance of the preceding movie in the 
sequelogy. 
On the other hand, inertia based on performance over time is likely to distil a belief 
that risks entailed in changing a sequel design beyond the limited scope required for 
continuation of the narrative, will have an adverse impact on the identity of the series. 
For instance, a very successful movie will be seen as having some central features 
that appeal to the audience in particular. In the case of Star Wars movies, the 
spaceship battles and Jedi Knights may be seen as crucial to sequel identity. 
Dabbling to reshape such elements is high risk and is likely to contribute to inertia. 
However, on the other hand, given that performance is seen as tangible evidence that 
one can do even better, these same elements may make movie makers aspire for even 
better performance, for instance, develop with plot concept around Jedi Knights in 
Star Wars sequels. This argument of an interaction between self-aspirations and 
inertia gives us the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Strategic learning in movie-sequels will be influenced by an 
interaction between inertia and self- aspirations based on box-ofce performance of 
prior movies in the sequelogy. 
Unlike inertia, aspirations are also comparative. Box-office comparison is likely to be 
benchmarked with the performance of a movie with a comparable budget that opens 
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around the same time 
-ideally the same weekend, in a given market. This comparative 
reference is likely to focus attention on those design elements of the thus, arguably 
rival movie, that made significant inroads into attracting audiences: whether it be 
attributed to a comic charater or a particular plot sequence. This argument gives us 
the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Strategic learning in movie-sequels will be influenced by an 
interaction between inertia and comparative-aspirations based on box-office 
performance. 
We assert that superior box-office performance of the comparative movie is likely to 
influence imitation of plot sequences and character profiles in a movie-sequel 
(Staiger, 1985; Lampel and Shamsie, 2003). This tendency may tend to be at odds 
with aspirations stemming from own performance that strive to build the identity of 
the sequel around central characters and plot sequences of the preceding feature. 
Furthermore, artistic egos in creative settings may amplify the self-creation premise. 
This gives us the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis 5: Strategic learning in movie-sequels will be influenced by an interaction 
between self- aspirations and comparative-aspirations based on box office 
performance. 
Performance by way of critical recognition is manifested in awards and nominations 
received by a movie. Film festivals and other award ceremonies are not only portals to 
launch new artists and recognise emerging talent, but are platforms where even 
established industry talents in all areas of film making strive for peer recognition. An 
100 
award or nomination recognises novelty and creative input associated with a movie's 
design and thus may affect changes that are introduced for the next movie in the 
sequelogy. This gives us the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Strategic learning in movie-sequels will be influenced by aspirations 
based on critical recognition. 
Movie projects are driven by two main motivations. One is the commercial motivation 
depicted by box-office performance and the other is the critical recogntion for 
creative excellence at peer portals like film festivals and other award ceremonies. 
While sequels generally tend to be made for the commercial appeal they hold, critical 
acclaim is also much sought after for the `creative egos' that characterise creative 
industries like motion pictures. This posits a need to balance the movie's design 
between the over arching studio goals of profitability and the aspirations of the 
creative team led by the movie director for critical recognition. Often these are 
complementary and tend to augment each other, but at the other times, they compete 
for shaping the design of a movie.. This gives us our final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: Strategic learning in movie-sequels will be chracterised by an 
interaction between aspirations based on box office performance and aspirations 
based on critical recognition. 
101 
5.5 Data and Variables 
5.5.1 Data 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 181 movies in 51 sequelogies with theatrical 
release in the United States over the period 1960-2005. The earliest sequelogy in the 
sample ends in 1973 and the latest ends in 2005 as on Ist of April, 2006. This 
sample is not exhaustive as we have been constrained by lack of data on several 
sequels that has made us exclude a potential 29 more sequelogies from our sample. 
Furthermore, lack of data on the comparative reference movies made us exclude 
another 19 sequelogies. Movies with peculiarities that brought them in conflict with 
the conventional understanding of a sequel were also omitted, for instance, Lord of the 
Rings movies have been omitted from the sample because the movies were shot at the 
same time with only the release of the movies being sequential. Each sequelogy 
comprising `n' movies contributes `n-1' observations or design transitions to the 
analysis. The total number of observations is thus: N: 181-51=130 design changes 
over successive movies. 
Archival data from web-based sources has informed our analyses. The main sources 
are the Internet Movie Database (IMDb), and the web portals: Film Box-office Data 
Base, Box-office Mojo and The Numbers (Nash Information Services). In addition we 
also examined reviews from numerous sources like BBC-films, New York Times, and 
other less known but active portals like Rotten Tomatoes and web magazines like the 
11"h Hour to understand the main elements of design change in a sequel. We also 
viewed movies in 21 of the 51 sequelogies in our sample. This allowed us to make 
sense of coding that uses, for example, a certain number of top characters to 
contribute to our design change variable. Design change and other variables in 
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analysis that have been operationalised using the aforesaid data are described in the 
following section. 
S. S. 2. Variables and Measures 
5.5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Design Change (DC +J) in the next sequel (s+l): We have argued that design of a 
movie can be seen as the plot and characters that make up the movie. Thus we 
propose two variables for design change one using the change in characters as an 
indicator of design change, and the other using change in plot as an indicator of 
design change. 
DC Characters: Our observations from viewing of movie sequels in the sample 
indicate that at least four fifths of a movie's footage seems to be consumed by the top 
five roles in credits order. Given this, we code for a change in the top five characters 
in order of credits: 
The lead character change is scored as 6 and then 5,4,3,2 in reducing order of credits 
to arrive at a sum of scores indicating change. The maximum change score possible is 
thus 20. If there is no change we code it as 1 for methodological and conceptual 
reasons. A movie sequel is a unique project and there are inevitable changes that 
impact on the profile of characters and their presentation. Thus, change from one to 
the other cannot be 0. 
If a character is retained but is positioned at a different level then the scores are 
accordingly adjusted. The sum of scores is coded as a proportion of the maximum 
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possible. For example, a change in the lead character (6) and the third character in 
credits order (4) is scored as 10 and the score is: (10/20) =0.5. 
DC Plot: We code for the proportion of new plot keywords over successive sequels 
as an indicator of plot change. These keywords are generated on Internet Movie 
Database (IMDb) by its expert panel and amended based on suggestions of registered 
users numbering nearly fifty thousand. We take plot change as a proportion of new 
keywords listed to total keywords listed for the later sequel in the pair over which 
design change is being examined. The keywords have a wide spread in picking upon 
notable plot features like for example, `car chase', `alcoholic', and `killer doll', 
among others. This measure provides for an approximation of both audience and 
expert opinions on change in plot. 
5.5.2.2 Control Variables 
Different movie sequelogies are characterised by a different number of films and by a 
spread in the time period between different pairs of successive movies therein. These 
differences are also likely to impact upon shaping of design changes for making of a 
sequel feature. For instance, a higher gap between films may result in more changes 
in the design given changing audience preferences. Alternatively, it may result in a 
great deal of retention in the design so that the identity of the sequel can be linked to 
its predecessor that is far back in time. The number of movies preceding a given 
sequel may also have an impact on the extent to which variations in design are 
considered important to maintain audience interest. In our analysis of design change, 
we control for both: the number of movies in a sequelogv (Cn) and; the time a 
between successive movies (Ct). 
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First week screens have been indicated in empirical studies to have a significant 
relationship with box-office performance (Chang and Jung, 2005; Simonton, 1994) 
and distribution strategy (Puttnam, 1997; Lampel and Shamsie, 2000). Thus we 
include number of openinz weekend screens for the preceding sequel movie (Sm) and 
comparative reference movie (Sc) as controls in explaining design change over 
sequels. A log transformation has been done on the number of screens given the wide 
range in screens on which movies in the sample were found to have been released. 
5.5.2.3 Independent Variables: 
Inertia based on average box-office performance (IN): We have argued that over time 
performance with a given strategic configuration makes it difficult to change strategic 
direction and thereby inhibits change. The ` average revenue /average budget' of 
preceding movies in a sequelogy is used as an indicator of inertia based on box- office 
performance. 
Self-aspirations based on box-office performance (SAP): Aspirations have been 
posited as a function of short-term performance, and unlike inertia, are not embedded 
in routines and practices that emerge over time in response to performance. Thus, the 
box-office performance (Revenue /Budget) of the preceding movie in the sequelogy 
is used as a measure of self-aspirations based on box-office performance; carried 
forward to influence design changes for the next feature in the series. 
Comparative-aspirations based on box-office performance (CAP): Movies released 
around the same time in a given market compete for audiences. A comparative 
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reference movie to a given movie is ideally: released on the same weekend as the 
reference movie; is in the top-grosser list with a better box-office performance to the 
sequel and; has the closest possible budget to the sequel movie. 
Obviously, these criteria were frequently difficult to combine. In some instances more 
than one movie competed for a comparative reference to a sequel and in several other 
cases, no realistic comparative reference could be found. We resolved these issues on 
a case by case basis to assess which movie would be a better comparative fit, if at all. 
In cases where there was no reliable comparative reference we had to discard a 
potential sample unit. 
Furthermore, we ignore genres for creating a comparative frame of reference because 
of their obscure and interwoven manifestation: any given movie is found to be a mix 
of genres like drama, mystery, and comedy, to name a few. Arguably, comparisons 
should also be contextualised based on the difference between when a movie was 
canned, to when it was eventually released, but information on the former is rarely 
available. Under these constrains, we code comparative-aspirations as: 
Opening weekend performance of the comparative movie / [divided by] opening 
weekend performance of the preceding sequel movie in the pair over which design 
change is being examined. 
Aspirations based on critical recognition: We code for two different measures of 
critical recognition: Number of awards won by the preceding movie in the pair of 
movies over which design change is being examined (A CA) and; number of 
nominations received awards won by the preceding movie in the pair of movies over 
which design change is being examined AAL 
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Comparative-aspirations based on critical recognition were not operationalisable for 
reasons of complexity in institutional mechanisms that impart such recognition. 
Firstly, there are different competitive levels a movie progresses through: several 
hundred potential nominees to a handful of movies that get nominated, of which, a 
still fewer number get awards. Secondly, the awards are given for different categories 
making it impossible to have a comparative reference movie. For example, if a sequel 
movie was to be nominated and the five awards were taken by other movies, which 
movie should be taken as the comparative reference movie for the sequel? 
Furthermore, in addition to a range of award ceremonies, film festivals are included in 
the total count of award and nominations. Festivals tend to be mutually exclusive in 
selection of films, further reducing any possibility of generating a comparative 
reference. For instance, a film with nominations at Cannes cannot be compared with 
another with a nomination at Venice. 
5.6 Analysis and Results 
We use correlations and hierarchical regression analysis to test the hypotheses. We 
ran two sets of regression analysis for each of the dependent variables we associate 
with design change over successive movie sequels. The first is change in plot, and the 
second is change in characters. In each set of analysis, simultaneous regression was 
done for the control variables and the main effects. This was then expanded 
hierarchically by including interaction effects to yield the full model. Table 5.1 
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Change in characters is significantly correlated with the number of years since the 
preceding movie. Given that audience preferences change, and audience memory of 
the last movie in the sequelogy becomes weaker with time: the greater the time gap, 
the greater is the possibility of changing even the main characters, often inexplicably 
intertwined with the identity of the sequels. 
Change in characters also shows a negative correlation with self-aspirations based on 
box-office performance of the preceding movie. This suggests that a downturn in 
box-office performance is associated with a higher possibility of change in 
characters. Interestingly, the correlation of self-aspirations with change in plot as an 
indicator of design change is positive. The indication here is that higher the box- 
office performance of the preceding movie greater is the confidence in the movie- 
project team to explore creative inputs in the plot for the next sequel. Unlike change 
in character, change in plot is also found to be significantly correlated with 
aspirations based on critical recognition, indicating motivating influence of such 
recognition on exploring creative inputs in the plot for the next sequel. 
The dichotomy of results for change in characters and change in plot continues in 
regression results reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. Upfront, the much 
richer influence of performance feedback on change in plot supports our earlier 
assertion that while changes in the plot are readily influenced by performance in 
movie sequels, change in characters is much more rooted in the identity of the 
sequel. For instance, as illustrated before, many of the sequels especially the 
franchises are shaped around characters, whether it is Spiderman, Indiana Jones, or 
Superman, to name a few famous ones. Plot identity of the sequel exists but usually 
109 
with less constrained connotations, and with a generous leaning towards the 
characters, for example, the Die Hard and Matrix movies, where lead characters are 
critical to the identity of a sequel. Thus, a significant change in the plot is more likely 
from performance feedback than a radical change in lead characters. This lends 
support to the difference in results over the two sets of regression analysis where the 
predictors are performance based inertia and performance based aspirations. 
Our results show that inertia based on average box-office performance inhibits plot 
change (table 5.3: model 3 to model 11). This provides support for hypothesis 1. We 
also find some support for Hypothesis 2 as self-aspirations influence design change 
both for change in characters (table 5.2: model 1 and model 2), and change in plot 
(table 5.3: model 1, model 3, and model 6 to model 8). However, in the case of the 
former self-aspirations tend to inhibit change in characters while, in the case of the 
latter, self-aspirations tend to encourage change in plot. 
This is in line with our arguments about the dichotomy between change in characters 
and change in plot from performance feedback: characters relate to the identity of a 
sequelogy, and by extension, a superior performance is likely to inhibit changes in 
this design component as reinforcing the faith in the sequelogy. On the other hand, 
plot changes stem from the need for new inputs into the next sequel, and superior 
performance is likely to lead to encouragement for engaging in such exploration. 
We find weak support for hypothesis 3. Inertia and self-aspirations do not show any 
significant interaction for change in plot and only a marginally significant negative 
interaction for change in characters (table 5.2: model 3). One reason for this may lie 
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in the internal benchmarking with own past performance that characterises self- 
aspirations. Interpretation of one's own past performance is more subjective, and 
thus fickle, relative to when the benchmark is external as in the case of comparative- 
aspirations. 
We find strong results for positive interaction between inertia and comparative- 
aspirations in the case of plot change (table 5.3: model 3 to model 11). This supports 
hypothesis 4 in indicating that externally benchmarked aspirations tend to narrow 
focus to changes that imitate the rival movie's success attributes, as manifested in its 
plot: a car chase sequence, or even, more blood and gore in a horror movie, as may 
be applicable. A weak significance also characterises this interaction in the case of 
change in characters (table 5.2: model 3): externally benchmarked aspirations seem 
to be disposed towards encouraging change in characters. With reference to change 
in characters, this marginal result suggest that: if at all, comparative movies are 
imitated for change in characters, it results in sweeping changes given that many of 
the sequels tend to be shaped around character identities. 
We find some support for Hypothesis 5 for change in Plot (table 5.3: model 7 to 
model 8). This negative interaction between self-aspirations and comparative- 
aspirations indicates a conflict between internal and external benchmarking of 
aspirations. It also supports our earlier results that show an opposition in how they 
interact with inertia. 
Results also indicate that aspirations based on critical recognition through awards 
encourage change in plot (table 5.3: model5, and model 7 to model 11). However, 
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there is a negative interaction between self-aspirations based on box office 
performance and critical recognition through awards (table 5.3: model7, model 10, 
and model 11). Also, over the model 9 to model 11 of table 5.3, self-aspirations from 
box-office performance are not significant while aspirations from critical recognition 
(awards) are. 
This indicates that in the case of movie sequels, there may be a case for conflict 
between informing change from these two different kinds of performance mechanism 
aft seen as complementary in the industry. By extension, there also may be a 
suggestion here that the self-aspirations of the project team led by the movie director 
are also driven by critical recognition than only by box office success. On the other 
hand, studios may want the creative and commercial tension to go more in favour of 
the commercial. Alternatively, the interpretation of the interaction result could also 
be more intuitive: the impetus to change would come only if either box-office 
performance or critical recognition are lacking, if both are high, there may be 
reduced motivation for changing even the plot beyond the required to generate a new 
albeit marginally different sequel movie. 
Finally, the control variables support our assertions about change in character, and 
change in plot. The extent of time that passes before a subsequent sequel is shaped 
affects the possibility, and probably the need, to modify characters given changing 
audience preferences and fading memory of the last movie (table 5.2: model 1 to 
model 11). In the case of plot change, number of movies made before in the 
sequelogy increases the need to modify the plot to maintain the novelty of the next 
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The empirical examination of strategic learning in movie sequels in this chapter 
provides external validity to our earlier examination of the phenomenon in the quasi- 
experimental settings of Robot Wars. Results from strategic learning in Robot Wars 
find validation. Strategic learning is a function of an interaction between inertia and 
aspirations. This interaction represents the inherent tension between exploitation of 
past certainties and exploration of new possibilities (March, 1991) and thus moderates 
convergence as a consequence of performance feedback. 
Here we examine design changes over successive movie sequels as an indicator of 
learning from performance feedback to shape actions for future events by striking a 
balance between inertia and aspirations. This balance is an indicator of moderating 
convergence as a consequence of learning that we have argued before to be at the 
heart of this dissertation. This is because such learning is crucial for survival and 
adaptability in competitive situations. 
We argue that performance feedback shapes inertia and aspirations to inform design 
changes for successive sequels. These forces capture the inherent tension between 
over time cohesion in strategic configurations and demands of responding to 
competitive pressures in a dynamic environment. 
In the motion picture industry, assessing the performance of a movie is contingent on 
both critical recognition, and box office performance. Alongside our assertion from 
extant literature that inertia is largely self referential, while aspirations are both self 
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and comparative, we develop a range of variables representing the interaction between 
inertia and aspirations as a function of past performance. 
Our results show that aspiration from box office performance moderate inertia that is 
inherent in successive sequel movies; inertia stemming from the need for identity with 
the series. Comparative-aspirations tend to narrow the focus of changes to what 
worked best with rival movies and are in congruence with inertia. On the other hand, 
self-aspirations, in absence of an external reference are more exploratory and seem to 
reduce inertial tendencies in design change. However, self-aspirations tend to be more 
fickle and difficult as predictors of change than comparative-aspirations, given that 
they are internally benchmarked: evaluating one's own performance tends to be much 
more subjective. 
Results for aspirations stemming from performance based on critical recognition 
indicate some peculiarities of creative industries, the genre to which the movie 
industry belongs. The most notable of these is the role of peer recognition in 
encouraging design exploration. Though making of movie sequels is widely seen as 
dominated by commercial motivations in our results, there is an indication of the 
`creative 
-commercial' tension in shaping a movie design. This maps on to the issue 
of multiplicity of goals and actors that engage in strategic experiences, a finding, that 
also characterised the quasi-experimental settings in the previous chapter. 
Our research site of movie-sequels as sequential project systems has provided a useful 
phenomenon for examining strategic learning. Usually, how a project is shaped in 
relation to its predecessors stems from interpretations of multiple past project 
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experiences that have a cumulative impact on organisational `sensemaking' (Weick, 
1995). By extension, associating a given project experience to future actions is 
obscured in this collective feedback and feed-forward process. However, in cases 
like movie sequels, a generational sequence between successive projects is 
discernable. Thus, the link between outcome of a past project experience and an 
action to modify routines and practices for delivering future projects is less 
ambiguous. The examination of strategic learning is supported by the relative ease of 





6.1 Concluding Thoughts 
The entire argument about reasons for learning in research and practice boils down to 
two fundamental motivations: one is to adapt to the changing environment and the 
other is to outperform competitors, by changing the way one engages in such 
competition. The sources of learning are events and experiences that individuals and 
organisations contextualise for making sense of the need for change, and the extent of 
disruption that such change may bring to established ways of doing things. 
When such experiences are strategic in nature, or in other words, have significant 
consequences for adaptability and survival, effective learning from performance 
feedback becomes crucial. Balancing pressures to converge to what works best, as 
against, seeking new sources of competitive advantage in light of such experiences, 
underpins our understanding of `strategic learning' in this dissertation. This 
dissertation has examined strategic learning, a concept that is still in relative infancy 
in strategy literature, by seeking answers to the following two questions: 
How does performance feedback from prior outcomes affect subsequent actions? 
and; 
What factors moderate this link? 
Robotic design contests and thereafter movie sequels as research sites have been used 
to inform these questions over three empirical studies. These sites have facillitated an 
examination of strategic learning primarily by virue of their characteristic of being 
repeat event systems. This feature has been central to addressing one of the major 
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bottlenecks in strategic learning research, that of establishing a link between two 
strategic event-experiences across time for generating actionable feedback. 
The dissertation comprises three empirical studies followed by a review of extant 
literature on learning to examine the moorings of strategic learning in research. The 
constructs explored in this review provide a conceptual backdrop to operationalising 
strategic learning. 
The first study was conducted in the context of a quasi experimental research site of a 
robotic design contest called Robot Wars. The study investigated the impact of 
competitive performance on convergence. The study posits a tension between creating 
new sources of competitive advantage versus searching for the competitive edge in 
the constrained envelope of a few design features that are seen as critical to 
performance. Based on the simplicity theory (Miller, 1993), we examined this tension 
which inherently resonates with the classic continuum between exploration of new 
possibilities and exploitation of past certainties (March, 1991). We find that striking a 
balance between simplicity in experimentation and variety in experimentation, or in 
other words, moderating the propensity to converge from performance feedback is 
key to successful performance. 
The second study examined inertia and aspirations as factors whose interplay shapes 
strategic learning. Inertia as a propensity to maintain status quo supports convergence 
as organisational efforts in response to past performance tend to be characterised by 
reducing the scope of changes. On the other hand aspirations tend to unlock this 
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mindset towards convergence and promote exploration of new possibilities to inform 
the strategic configuration. 
Our empirical results also provide a rationale for the existence of different 
performance assessment mechanisms that characterised the research site of Robot 
Wars. Combat performance in a clear win-loose based progression in the tournament 
style contest made teams converge to certain design features that were seen to be 
critical to superior performance. This was because in general, the influence of inertia 
clearly dominated the influence of aspirations when it came to affecting convergence. 
In contrast to contestant objective of winning in combat, the contest objective was 
entertainment through deployment of nascent and novel designs. Competitive 
performance provided impetus for convergence that reduced novelty. This thus 
required moderation, if the contest was to remain entertaining. The need for 
preventing overt convergence was manifested in special award nominations. Such 
nominations tried to draw attention to teams that did not necessarily do well in combat 
but added to the entertainment by being distinctively novel in design, or being 
distinctive in the way that they engaged in combat. 
This perspective on multiplicity in levels, goals and partial contexts posits them as 
important issues in shaping actionable feedback from past performance. 
The final study has been conducted using a non-experimental research site: the motion 
picture industry, with the motivation to provide generalisability to the examination of 
strategic learning in quasi-experimental settings in the prior chapters. We successfully 
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validate our central finding by providing empirical evidence for interplay between 
inertia and aspirations in shaping strategic learning as manifested in change in design 
of movies in a sequelogy. We also provide some insights into the peculiarities of the 
creative milieu that characterises the motion picture industry, and contextualise 
different performance assessment mechanisms. 
6.2 Contributions to Research 
At the onset of this dissertation we discussed the opportunity repeat event systems 
offer in examining learning as a process of generating actionable feedback from past 
performance. In examining such event-experiences that have significant consequences 
across time, and are thus strategic in nature, we have assessed knowledge transfer 
from one experience to the other as an enactment of strategic learning. The central 
contribution of this dissertation in context of this enactment is to provide empirical 
evidence for: (a) strategic learning in repeat event systems; (b) the effect of 
performance feedback on convergence and; (c) the factors that shape strategic 
learning for moderating such convergence. 
Repeat event systems in controlled settings of a design contest, and then movie 
sequels, have been examined to provide such evidence and external validity to the 
study respectively. In the process, we have accounted for many of the methodological 
challenges that impact research in the area of strategic learning. Our findings support 
the assertion that effective strategic learning to moderate convergence pressures 
distinguishes winners from the `also-rans'. We have also shown that cognitive and 
behavioural orientation of organisations, as aspirations and inertia respectively, 
interact to shape strategic learning to moderate such convergence. 
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We posit that relationship between strategy and performance is mediated by learning. 
The more effective the learning, the better is the balance between searching from 
amongst past certainties, and exploring creative impetus to wrong foot competitors, 
establish new rules of competition, and radically reshape business models. This 
balance is crucial for sustainable competitive advantage. In light of seminal events 
that have significant consequences it matters even more as organisations often find 
themselves ` in times of profound change 
...... 
' (Hoffer, 1955) and learning becomes 
crucial for survival. This reiterates the thought from Eric Hoffer that this dissertation 
began with. 
Learning has a reinforcing nature and when organisations fail to counter this they are 
often said to be characterised by `competency traps' and `organisational myopia' 
(Radner, 1975; Levinthal and March, 1993). The `preoccupation with a single goal, 
strategic activity, department, or world view' (Miller, 1993) is an inevitable 
consequence of past performance. Inherently, simplicity is not detrimental to 
performance but when this becomes a limiting factor that results in a `lock in' to 
inhibit exploration by limiting `the range and variety of action' it leads to 
organisational decline (Miller, 1993). This dissertation has contributed to this strand 
of thinking by examining learning as a means to moderate convergence and looking at 
factors that shape such learning 
6.3 Implications for Managerial Practice 
Implications for managerial practice from this study are two fold. The first is about 
managerial orientation towards sensemaking of performance feedback. The other 
relates to the potential of the emerging phenomenon of design contests, which enables 
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firms to lower their risks through market free experimentation. Design contests are 
also important commercial opportunities, for instance, in cases where participating in 
them has implications for organisational visibility in nascent industries. 
Managerial response to performance feedback is usually that of being able to evaluate 
and narrow down to critical parts of the strategic configuration. This process over 
time tends to be self-reinforcing. The inward looking orientation keeps increasing to a 
point where an incompatibility of the strategic configuration with the environment 
finally manifests itself in organisational crisis. 
One example that illustrates this is the sequence of projects in the National 
Aeronautical and Space Administration's (NASA) Apollo programme that spanned 
seventeen project generations. This succession extended the objective of `landing a 
man on the Moon and returning him safely to Earth' (Kennedy, 1961) from a simple 
touchdown on the moon to lunar exploration. 
Apollo 13 as a case of design failure is one of the most discussed missions in this 
series of projects. Launched with an objective to perform a manned lunar landing in a 
specified region it ran into unforeseen difficulties. The landing had to be abandoned 
following an explosion in one of the oxygen tanks crippling the command service 
module, forcing the astronauts to use the lunar module as a lifeboat. The crew risked 
being lost out in space due to navigational problems that ensued. However, 
improvisations were made to make sure that despite the unprecedented problems, the 
astronauts returned home safely. 
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The episode had a seminal impact on changes in managerial perceptions about what 
till then was a tried and tested and thus, best way of designing mission vehicles and 
terrestrial control systems. However, it took Apollo 13 to happen before the 
realisation that aspirations of performance had come to odds with the over time 
embedded routines that guided mission design. 
While simplicity may make it easier to motivate managers as they clear see a 
dominant goal and a dominant way of working, but it may also `fixate a single of way 
of seeing and doing things' (Miller, 1993, p. 122; Lumpkin and Dess, 2006). This 
dissertation suggests that simplicity being the dominant paradigm in strategising may 
be inevitable, but it needs to be moderated by a conscious effort to create and not only 
search for solutions to deliver competitive advantage. 
The ability to quickly arrive at the important factors at hand to improve performance 
is sub-optimal. The ability to deploy a perspective on looking farther than the factors 
at hand needs to form an integral part of the managerial mindset. An example of 
breaking away from the simplicity mould is seen in the move away from the idea of 
`best practices' in how organisations strategise for the projects they do. Organisations 
like BP explicitly emphasise the need to explore the idea of `good practices' that is by 
nature less inertial (Collison and Parcell, 2001). It seeks to open up both the existing, 
and the new ways of working on projects to sensemaking for actionable feedback 
The growth in the realm of design contests also holds managerial implications. This is 
because such contests are portals where nascent technologies can be tested and 
developed in competitive settings. Though usually these are an inadequate 
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representation of industrial competition, in their controlled settings, they are arguably 
less risky portals to experiment in than real business settings. Aside from institutions 
like the army that are trying to develop unmanned military vehicles through such 
contests, business organisations like Google with its Doodle 4 Google competition 
seem to have alternate uses for such contests. In the Doodle 4 Google competition 
they are promoting the Google brand by encouraging creative graphics from school 
children. 
Google had also recently organized an international search engine placement contest 
which had important implications for how web pages are ranked, an issue central to 
its dominance as the premium search portal. That the contest explored inputs from 
outside the Google mindset about `what mattered for such ranking', provided new 
directions to how Google could sustain its competitive position. Managerial role in 
promoting such cognitive fusion through contests is clearly a useful moderator for 
convergence to a narrow set of business paradigms in response to performance 
The kind of possibilities design contests it opens up is probably not fathomable at this 
stage. That managerial sensemaking keeps tab on this phenomenon for both 
commercial opportunities as participants and experimentation opportunities as 
sponsors is likely to be crucial for contributing to the shaping of strategies in the 
future. 
For instance, the Virgin Galactic and New Mexico spaceport agreement that stemmed 
from the Ansari Xprize contest has launched the space industry by seeking to enable 
private spaceflights by 2007. Clearly this has tremendous implications for both the 
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participants and the sponsors. The $15 million prize tag for the first tickets is surely 
just as unrealistic as the idea of design contests emerging so rapidly some years ago. 
Still, those who dare to aspire and have resources to match have bought it: both the 
ticket and the idea for the next generation! 
6.4 Limitations 
One of the wider issues in strategy research remains the scope of data and size of 
sample that can be deployed for empirical analysis. Despite the design dependent 
issue of `what is a small sample? ' use of small samples and secondary data dominates 
strategy research, while the view that large samples make empirical analysis more 
robust also holds true (Phelan et al., 2002; Lampel and Shapira, 1995). In comparison 
to secondary data, primary data to inform strategy research is frequently confronted 
by access issues as it tends to be sensitive and located at multiple levels in 
organisations. 
While this dissertation has tried to negotiate the bottlenecks that characterise strategy 
research, we have used archival data to examine convergence as a consequence of 
performance feedback, and to create proxies for aspirations and inertia based on 
performance. Without a doubt, primary data from contestant team members in Robot 
Wars would have also been a very rich source to inform such behavioural and 
cognitive constructs. However, though an amateur setting with low access barriers 
relative to business organisations, here also primary data access poses limiting 
problems, especially when generating data points contingent upon: tracking of and 
repeat access with teams in the contest over successive series and; contestant teams 
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being able to reflect back on a series in the past without biases that stem from 
subsequent performance 
In providing generalisability to our findings from the quasi experimental site, we also 
examine movie sequels as repeat event systems where also, we use secondary data to 
inform our measures for empirical analysis. We do not engage team level dynamics 
given that we juxtapose the design of a movie and its performance as in the 
examination of strategic learning in Robot Wars, where also, we do not examine team 
level dynamics. The scope of the empirical examination thus remains limited to 
design changes as manifestation of performance feedback: machine specifications in 
the case of Robot Wars, and correspondingly, plot and character changes in the case 
of movie sequels. 
Data limitations have affected our sampling in the case of examining strategic 
learning over successive movie-sequels. For instance, we have been required to drop a 
substantial number of sequels from analysis for data sufficiency reasons, and reduce 
the scope of our criteria for generating movies to benchmark comparative-aspirations 
of sequel movies. 
In the case of Robot Wars though archival data is extensive, the sample omits some 
participant team designs. This is because there were several instances of missing 
design information on some contestant teams and in other cases; the identity of the 
machine was in doubt. The latter was due to change in the label/name of the machine 
and drastic reshaping of the contestant teams that sometimes had break away 
members who deployed a different machine in the next series. 
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6.5 Implications for Future Research 
The study of project based sequential systems to examine strategic learning in the 
motion picture industry encourages uch examination in `project-based 
organisations', and in industries characterized by a high degree of `project orientation' 
(DeFillipe and Arthur, 1998; Turner and Peyami, 1996; Lampel and Jha, 2003). The 
element of heredity in project portfolios may be rather nuanced to establish in most 
cases however, operationalising it would surely bring strategic learning research 
closer to implications for practice. 
Sequential competition in industries like computers and aircrafts is another realm 
where strategic learning's implications for practice can be taken forward relatively 
easily. In these industries, new generation of technologies start a series of contests to 
exploit the technology till a new technology, or a technology that matures after a 
certain period in incubation, shifts gear to a new phase of such contests. The transition 
from the piston engine to the jet engine over the mid 20th century is but one example 
of this phenomenon. Strategic learning from performance feedback from such 
generational iterations of competition could inform actions that lead to more 
successful and sustainable competitive designs (Lampel and Jha, 2005). 
We have also referred to `causality' (Hedberg et al., 1976), or the nature of reasons 
behind performance as a promising construct in extant literature that could contribute 
to the study of strategic learning. This could be a fourth, explanatory dimension to add 
to our study that engages cognitive, behavioural and hereditary explanations for 
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Granny's Revenge II Hypno Disc 
4X4 Barber-Ous I 
Rev. of Trouble &Strife Bulldog Breed 
Spin Doctor Kat 3 01 
Brutus Maximus Razer 
WAS. P Raging Reality 
Weld-Dora Cyrax 
Ruf Ruf Dougal Tetanus II 
Infernal Contraption 259 
Infinity Aggrobot3 
UFO Wild Thing 2
The Stag Vader 
Corkscrew Pan cAttack 
R. O. C. S Kronic 2 
Sabre Tooth A4 lI 
Reptirron The Second Terrorhurtz 
Hot Pants Ming III 
The Hassocks Hog SPAM 
Tiberius III Supernova 
Short Circuit Sawn Again 
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Appendix A: Robot Wars Series Progression contd... 
s 4-Way Melee Round 
rminate Through 
hip pawnPgam 
NEATer Machine Revenge of T&S Z The Errecttroner R. 0 C. S. 
Topbot Raging Nightmare 
Sawpoird2 Tornado 
Devastator Ewe2 
W Barbefous 2h a Bt Lereler2 
Thunde ants' Tetanus Booster 
Rick 
Hassoks Hog 2 
Dantomkia 
King B Powerworks 
Tomahawk Scorpion 
The Stag IG-8B 
Herbmator 13 Black 
The Alien Lightning 
Hydra Gravity 
Hodaf the Bad Thor 
Black and Blue Firestorm V 
Bamm Bamm Daisy Cutter 
Aggrobot Re ernon2 
Zorro Ripper 
Demolition Man Mute 
J 





_ Sub-Verson 1.1 Steel h enger 
Shredder Evolution Trax 
Kan, 
-Opener The Gnm Reaper 
Barbaric Response Big Nipper 
m Terrorhtru Gprobot 
Kille4<at Jackson Wallop 
Metabrs Scraptosaur 
Ming Die Nagy Cams 
= Mega Hurts LT St Agra 
The Scrapper Revoluhon3 
Major Tam3 X-Termmator2 
Diabolus Tsunami 
LL Fluffy Vigor Carrot 2
Scare 
-Go-Round Constrictor F 
Jabber Bulldog Breed 
Infernal Contraption Mantis 
T-Wrecks Hard 
Veloän pa Kai 3 
Spndodor Panic Attack 
Edge Hog Mega Morg 
Disc-O-Interno Tough as Nails 
Blades a( Destruction Robochrcken 
Colossus T hoon2 
Un Rotating Object Bigger rather 0 isconstngor Hammerhead 
Xenomorph Iron-Awe 21 
a of Mi M ouse 
1 i4ST ThermidorII 
inser he Wed eho 
Cobra The Kraken 
wrster Pussycat 
Brutus Maximus Roobarb 
Vader M2 
Shell Shock r erius II 
error Turtle omrc 
C us s MIDSY 
Araknia Hellbent 
I Bot One Bets --Wean-Streak 
Did not fight 
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I Second Round Quarter-Finals Finals 
Appendix B: Floor Plan of the Robot Wars Battle Arena 
Camri 
CO Hole %if CO Hole cone 
" iý '
-ý 350 mm Chop Saw bo 
n0Y Flame 











eis Hopse 350 mm Chop Sdw. ti 
0ý 
bý 
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